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LIMITING FRIVOLOUS SHAREHOLDER 
LAWSUITS VIA FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS:  
A CALL FOR DELAWARE TO OVERTURN 
AND REVISE ITS FEE-SHIFTING  
BYLAW STATUTE 
Abstract: Shareholder lawsuits have become an epidemic, with lawsuits being 
filed after almost every merger or acquisition, costing corporations and share-
holders billions of dollars. With little substantive and successful reform measures 
at the federal and state level, corporations have begun to take matters into their 
own hands, including adopting corporate bylaws to deter these lawsuits. This 
Note examines the Delaware Supreme Court’s controversial decision in 2014, 
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, in which the court approved the adop-
tion of fee-shifting bylaws by corporations. It further examines the Delaware 
State Legislature’s subsequent prohibition of fee-shifting provisions and explores 
the possibility that ambiguity in the legislation may allow fee-shifting bylaws in 
securities class action lawsuits. This Note argues that corporations should be 
statutorily allowed to adopt fee-shifting bylaws subject to shareholder approval 
and a maximum relief standard. With minimal chance that the Delaware legisla-
ture will immediately overturn its legislation, it argues alternatively that the Del-
aware courts should narrowly interpret the current statute so as not to not apply 
to securities class action lawsuits. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) are a central part of the current eco-
nomic marketplace.1 In recent years, however, these transactions have come 
under attack through an increasingly popular legal device: shareholder law-
suits.2 This growing trend has exploded in recent years, with 93% of all mer-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Mergers & Acquisition Review – Full Year, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2015), http://blog.
thomsonreuters.com/index.php/mergers-acquisition-review-full-year/ [http://perma.cc/N26V-F5CA] 
(finding that the worldwide value of mergers and acquisitions in 2014 totaled $3.5 trillion); Dan Pri-
mack, 2014 Was a Huge Year for M&A and Private Equity, FORTUNE (Jan. 5, 2015), http://fortune.
com/2015/01/05/2014-was-a-huge-year-for-ma-and-private-equity/ [http://perma.cc/4ZNW-7S3V] 
(noting that in 2014 the value of acquisitions in the United States was $1.3 trillion). 
 2 See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MER-
GERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2014), https://www.cornerstone.
com/GetAttachment/73882c85-ea7b-4b3c-a75f-40830eab34b6/-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-
and-A-2013-Filings.pdf [http://perma.cc/434E-QDG6] (finding that on average in 2013, M&A deals 
resulted in more than five lawsuits, and 62% of M&A deals were litigated in more than one jurisdic-
tion); Dionne Searcey & Ashby Jones, First, the Merger; Then the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 
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gers and acquisitions in 2013 being subject to at least one shareholder lawsuit.3 
Although one would hope that a large majority of these lawsuits result in mon-
etary benefits for the shareholders, this is unfortunately not the case.4 It has 
been estimated that shareholders lose $39 billion annually because of these 
lawsuits, compared to an average of $5 billion that investors receive as a result 
of lawsuit settlements.5 With an annual loss of $34 billion to shareholders, 
there is a need for legal reform in this area to curtail the abuse of frivolous 
shareholder lawsuits.6 
Unexpectedly, in May 2014, in ATP Tour Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 
the Delaware Supreme Court provided a potential solution to this problem 
when the court affirmed a corporation’s right to adopt fee-shifting bylaws.7 By 
affirming this right, a Delaware corporation could now adopt a corporate by-
law allowing it to shift all costs of litigation to any shareholder who brought an 
unsuccessful lawsuit against it.8 Just over a year later, however, the Delaware 
State Legislature ultimately decided to do away with this potential solution.9 In 
                                                                                                                           
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704482704576072050216781160 [http://
perma.cc/HQ89-9DDH] (discussing how statistics show that investors are filing a growing number of 
lawsuits against corporations engaging in deals). 
 3 See KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 1 (charting the percentage of deals valued over $100 million 
challenged by shareholders between 2007 and 2013). 
 4 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competi-
tion and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 479 (2015) (finding that only 4.8% of merger litigation 
provided a monetary benefit to shareholders); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settle-
ment in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 
566 (2014) (explaining that few cases result in a pecuniary recovery for shareholders). 
 5 See MUKESH BAJAJ ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1, 3 (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/EconomicConsequences_Web.pdf [http://
perma.cc/8M9P-UBGS] (finding that shareholders lose $39 billion annually upon the announcement 
of shareholder lawsuits, compared to the average of $5 billion, after attorney’s fees, that investors 
receive as a result of settlements). 
 6 See id.; see also Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits: 
A Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275, 303–09 (2004) (proposing to limit frivolous shareholder 
class action lawsuits through a notice-and-demand feature); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate 
Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37–
59 (2015) (proposing to limit frivolous shareholder lawsuits by reforming the corporate benefit doc-
trine). 
 7 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014). 
 8 See id.; Micah Hauptman, A Delaware Court Decision Threatens Effective Enforcement of Our 
Nation’s Securities Laws, While the SEC Stands Idly By, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2014, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/micah-hauptman/a-delaware-court-decision_b_6145982.html [http://
perma.cc/G5TH-PKV3] (describing how a corporation could amend its bylaws to include a provision that 
would make a plaintiff shareholder liable for all litigation expenses in an unsuccessful lawsuit); Gretchen 
Morgenson, Shareholders, Disarmed by a Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/26/business/shareholders-disarmed-by-a-delaware-court.html [http://perma.cc/VL4Q-97MW] 
(explaining that a company could now adopt fee-shifting bylaws that require shareholders who bring 
unsuccessful lawsuits to pay the company’s litigation fees).  
 9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (West 2015). 
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June 2015, the Governor of Delaware Jack Markell signed into law a prohibi-
tion against fee-shifting bylaws for stock corporations.10 With this new law in 
place, Delaware corporations once again have minimal protection against friv-
olous shareholder lawsuits.11 
This Note argues that Delaware should amend its fee-shifting prohibition 
and, barring that, Delaware courts should read the statute narrowly and not 
apply it to securities class action lawsuits.12 Part I of this Note discusses corpo-
rate governance structures and describes the use, and possible abuse, of share-
holder derivative lawsuits and shareholder class action lawsuits as well as re-
form measures by the federal government and several states.13 Part II examines 
attempts at shareholder lawsuit reform in Delaware and then reviews the Del-
aware Supreme Court’s approval of fee-shifting bylaws in ATP Tour.14 Part III 
focuses on the Delaware State Legislature’s response to the ATP Tour decision, 
including the legislature’s subsequent prohibition of fee-shifting bylaws for 
stock corporations.15 Finally, Part IV proposes two solutions that Delaware 
could take to limit the negative effects of shareholder lawsuits.16 First, it pro-
poses that the Delaware State Legislature should amend its corporate laws to 
allow corporations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws.17 Alternatively, recognizing 
that the Delaware State Legislature is unlikely to immediately reverse course, 
Part IV also proposes that Delaware courts should read the statute prohibiting 
fee-shifting bylaws narrowly so that it does not apply to securities class action 
lawsuits.18 
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION: AN 
INCREASING TREND TOWARDS SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION  
LAWSUITS FOLLOWING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
This Part provides an overview of the corporate governance structure, ex-
plores two legal devices—shareholder derivative lawsuits and class action law-
suits—that provide shareholders with the ability to police corporate govern-
ance decisions, and discusses legislative shareholder reform measures at both 
the federal and state level.19 Section A reviews the corporate governance struc-
ture and the formation of shareholder derivative and class action lawsuits.20 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See id. 
 11 See infra notes 190–247 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 190–247 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 19–104 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 105–154 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 155–189 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 190–247 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 193–220 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 221–247 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 19–104 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
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Section B discusses the characteristics and typical outcomes of shareholder 
derivative lawsuits.21 Section C describes the recent trend away from deriva-
tive lawsuits and towards shareholder class actions lawsuits.22 Section C also 
examines the nature of these shareholder class action lawsuits, in particular 
how they are now brought following almost every merger or acquisition.23 
Lastly, Section D discusses past and current legislative shareholder lawsuit 
reform measures taken by the federal government, as well as the state legisla-
tures of New Jersey and Oklahoma.24 
A. The Corporate Governance Structure 
The governance of a corporation consists of three actors: shareholders, di-
rectors, and officers.25 Shareholders are “owners” of the corporation, directors 
are responsible for managing and supervising the corporation, and officers are 
the corporate employees who are responsible for running the corporation’s 
day-to-day business.26 Elected by the shareholders, directors owe duties to act 
on behalf of and represent the interests of the corporation.27 As such, the direc-
tors also owe fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders.28 
The fiduciary duties that directors owe to the corporation and its share-
holders are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.29 The duty of care requires 
directors to exercise good business judgment during their decision-making 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 36–53 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 54–81 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 54–81 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 82–104 and accompanying text. 
 25 See ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS 33–34 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining 
that within the governance of a corporation there are three categories of actors: shareholders, directors 
and officers). 
 26 See id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (explaining that the business and affairs of a 
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors). 
 27 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (explaining that directors owe fidu-
ciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders); PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 34; 
Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 J. BUS. L. 675, 
681 (2013), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jbl/vol11/iss3/4 [http://perma.cc/BY8E-NHEJ] (explain-
ing that directors have a fiduciary duty to the corporations on whose boards they serve); William M. 
Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 
PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (explaining that directors are required to protect the interests of the corpo-
ration). 
 28 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (Del. 1981) (stating that a director has a 
fiduciary relationship to the stockholders); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939) (describ-
ing how the directors of a corporation have a fiduciary relationship with its shareholders); Lafferty et al., 
supra note 27, at 841 (explaining that directors are charged with a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s 
shareholders). 
 29 See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 38; Holland, supra note 27, at 679 (explaining 
that directors are fiduciaries who are obligated to fulfill the duties of care and loyalty); Lafferty et al., 
supra note 27, at 841 (stating that directors, to satisfy their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and 
its shareholders, must satisfy the duties of care and loyalty). 
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processes, and act as a reasonably prudent person in their position would act.30 
The duty of loyalty forces directors to place the corporation’s interests before 
their own.31 This duty imposes a legal obligation on a corporation’s directors 
to act in good faith and make decisions that are solely in the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders, rather than advancing their own personal 
interests.32 If directors breach their fiduciary duties, they can be held liable for 
any resulting corporate losses.33 
Because directors control the corporation’s decision making, and thus 
cannot be trusted to sue themselves, two legal devices have been formed to 
provide shareholders with the ability to enforce a director’s liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty.34 These devices are the shareholder derivative lawsuit and 
the shareholder class action lawsuit.35 
B. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits 
Shareholder derivative lawsuits involve intracompany litigation brought 
by one or more shareholders on behalf of the corporation in which they own 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Smith, 488 A.2d at 872–73 (noting that under the duty of care, a director has a duty to exer-
cise an informed business judgment); PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 38 (explaining how 
the duty of care requires managers to be prudent and attentive when making decisions); Holland, su-
pra note 27, at 691 (describing how before directors vote on a transaction, they are required by the 
duty of care to apprise themselves of “all material information that is reasonably available” to them). 
 31 See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (explaining that directors and officers cannot use their positions to 
further their private interests); PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 521 (describing the duty of 
loyalty as a duty to avoid self-dealing); Lafferty et al., supra note 27, at 844–45 (describing the duty 
of loyalty as one that requires a director to put the interests of the corporation ahead of his or her 
own). 
 32 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (holding that a director’s failure to act in 
good faith can result in a breach of the duty of loyalty); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 
345, 361 (Del. 1993) (explaining that the duty of loyalty requires the corporation’s best interests to 
take priority over those of any director or officer); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (explaining that the duty of loyalty mandates that a director “acts in the good faith belief 
that [their] actions are in the corporation’s best interest”). 
 33 See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 39. 
 34 See id.; see also Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947) (ex-
plaining that directors and officers accused of wrongdoing generally have the ability to limit the cor-
poration’s efforts to remedy their wrongs); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect 
Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) (discussing the structure of 
derivative lawsuits and observing that corporate officers are often the subject of the alleged miscon-
duct underlying the derivative lawsuit). 
 35 See Erickson, supra note 34, at 76 (explaining that securities class actions and derivative suits 
are the primary means by which shareholders enforce the legal duties of corporations and their man-
agers); Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empiri-
cal Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 
146 (2007) (explaining that the law allows shareholders to bring two types of legal proceedings to 
vindicate their rights: direct suits or derivative suits). 
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stock.36 Because the shareholder is suing on behalf of the corporation, the cor-
poration is both the “functional plaintiff” and the nominal defendant.37 In a 
shareholder derivative lawsuit, shareholders have the ability to bring suit in a 
representative capacity on behalf of the corporation in order to remedy or pre-
vent a wrong to the corporation.38 This is because corporate directors may be 
involved in the wrongdoing and are therefore unlikely to make a neutral deci-
sion regarding whether to file suit.39 Typically, these lawsuits allege a breach 
of fiduciary duty by the corporation’s board of directors and seek to recover 
losses sustained by the corporation due to the board’s harmful actions.40 A 
claim of corporate waste or claims that a corporation’s officers or directors 
breached their fiduciary duty by making false or misleading public statements 
often bring rise to shareholders derivative lawsuits.41 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Koster, 330 U.S. at 522 (explaining that in a derivative lawsuit the plaintiffs bring the cor-
poration’s cause of action before the court, not their own); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 
1984) (explaining that the derivative action was established to allow shareholders to sue in the corpo-
ration’s name); PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 39. 
 37 See Liddy v. Urbanek, 707 F.2d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 1983); Jessica Erickson, Corporate 
Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2010) 
(explaining that the corporation is the “functional plaintiff”). Because the corporation is the party who 
actually benefits from a successful suit, the plaintiff is “at best the nominal plaintiff.” See Liddy, 707 
F.2d at 1224. However, the corporation is initially named as a defendant to ensure they are a party to 
the lawsuit. See id. 
 38 See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1264 (Del. 2012) (explaining that a deriva-
tive suit enables a shareholder to bring a lawsuit on the corporation’s behalf, for harm done to it); 
Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Del. 1999) (explaining that a derivative 
claim is brought by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf, to remedy harm inflicted on the corpo-
ration). 
 39 See Koster, 330 U.S. at 522 (explaining that directors and officers accused of wrongdoing gen-
erally have the ability to suppress any effort by the corporation to remedy their wrongs); Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 811 (explaining that derivative lawsuits were developed to enable shareholders to sue when 
corporate directors refused to bring a claim for harm done to the corporation); Erickson, supra note 
34, at 81 (stating that officers and directors may be involved in misconduct and therefore may not be 
willing to act in the corporation’s best interests by filing a suit that may implicate themselves). 
 40 See Koster, 330 U.S. at 522 (describing how the derivative lawsuit was invented to remedy 
breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate managers); Erickson, supra note 34, at 82 (explaining that in 
derivative lawsuits, shareholders often claim a breach of fiduciary duty by the officers or directors). 
 41 See Katz v. Halperin, No. 13811, 1996 WL 66006, at *4 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that cor-
porate waste claims are brought as derivative actions); Erickson, supra note 34, at 82 (noting that 
shareholder allegations that “officers or directors breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation by 
making . . . false or misleading public statements” are common in derivative lawsuits); Griffith, supra 
note 6, at 9 (stating that claims of corporate waste are a classic example of a derivative lawsuit); see 
also Kevin LaCroix, Target Directors and Officers Hit with Derivative Suits Based on Data Breach, 
D&O DIARY (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/02/articles/cyber-liability/target-
directors-and-officers-hit-with-derivative-suits-based-on-data-breach/ [http://perma.cc/9RAC-EAWY] 
(describing multiple shareholder derivative suits that were brought against Target, alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty and waste of corporate assets, as a result of a data breach). 
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Any amount a shareholder derivative lawsuit recovers belongs to the cor-
poration and will be paid into the corporation’s treasury.42 As such, the plain-
tiff who brings suit does not receive any direct financial benefit.43 At most, 
shareholders may receive an indirect benefit from the suit, such as an increase 
in stock price.44 Monetary recovery for shareholders is generally either non-
existent or minimal.45 Indeed, the vast majority of shareholder derivative law-
suits end in dismissal or settlement, in which the only results are changes to the 
corporation’s governance structure or mechanisms.46 
These cases often settle for two reasons.47 First, because of the minimal 
financial incentives for shareholders, derivative lawsuits are typically brought 
by aggressive plaintiffs’ firms on behalf of insignificant shareholders.48 With 
minimal pressure to obtain a substantive result for shareholders, the plaintiffs’ 
firm’s primary goal in these suits is to recover substantial legal fees and ex-
penses.49 Thus, these firms often choose to settle to ensure they recover their 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (explaining that in a derivative 
suit, any damages recovered are paid to the corporation); Erickson, supra note 37, at 1756 (noting that 
in a derivative suit, any recovery is given to the corporation); Griffith, supra note 6, at 8 (explaining 
that any recovery made by the shareholders is actually a recovery by the corporation and thus is paid 
into the corporation’s treasury). 
 43 See Ams. Mining Corp., 51 A.3d at 1264 (noting that the corporation must receive any recovery 
from the suit); Erickson, supra note 34, at 81 (explaining that shareholders do not receive any direct 
financial benefit from a derivative suit). 
 44 See Erickson, supra note 34, at 81 (explaining that because of their stock ownership, share-
holders may receive an indirect financial benefit); Alison Frankel, Ugly-Duckling Shareholder De-
rivative Suits Are Poised for Swandom, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2015/01/02/ugly-duckling-shareholder-derivative-suits-are-poised-for-swandom/ [http://perma
.cc/57U7-NHCF] (describing how shareholders benefit only indirectly from settled derivative law-
suits, such as through an increase in share price). 
 45 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1775 (2004) (finding that in Delaware derivative suits filed in 1999 
and 2000, out of fifty-seven lead cases resolved, only six resulted in monetary recovery). 
 46 See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 469 (reporting that although only 39.3% of transactions 
attracted litigation in 2005, the frequency of litigation had risen to 92.1% by 2011); Erickson, supra 
note 34, at 96–97 (finding evidence that many settlements are largely nominal and only consist of the 
corporation agreeing “to implement small-scale corporate governance reforms”). 
 47 See Ferris et al., supra note 35, at 146. 
 48 See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1982) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the 
claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff, who owned only 100 out of 8 million outstanding 
shares, could not fairly and adequately represent the interests of other shareholders); Ohio-Sealy Mat-
tress Mfg. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 25 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that plaintiffs who owned only 0.7% 
of the corporation’s outstanding shares could adequately represent the corporation in their suit); Erick-
son, supra note 34, at 100 (collecting sources). 
 49 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing the real incentive behind deriva-
tive actions as the hope of plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover large fees); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. 
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 
81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 318 (1981) (describing the economic interest of plaintiffs’ lawyers as being 
focused on a large award of attorney’s fees, not in a large recovery for shareholders); Erickson, supra 
note 34, at 101 (stating that plaintiffs’ attorneys typically receive between 20–30% of the lawsuits’ 
recovery); Rodney Yap et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for Investors, 
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fees, rather than risk losing the case and recovering no fees at all.50 Second, the 
corporation’s management also has strong incentives to settle in order to min-
imize the corporation’s legal fees and because of the nature of most corporate 
insurance polices.51 
Due to the actions of these plaintiffs’ firms, legislative and judicial sys-
tems, at both the state and federal level, have developed numerous legal hur-
dles to curb the abuse of shareholder derivative lawsuits.52 These include the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement, the demand requirement, and the 
formation of special litigation committees.53 
C. The Costly Trend of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits Following a 
Merger or Acquisition 
With the development of procedural hurdles in shareholder derivative 
lawsuits, shareholder class action suits have become an increasingly popular 
alternative, particularly those that target corporate mergers and acquisitions.54 
                                                                                                                           
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/
lawyers-cash-in-while-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals [http://perma.cc/BMJ3-
MWBC] (finding that in forty cases in which no money was generated for shareholders, overall, law-
yers obtained $32.4 million in fees for themselves). 
 50 See Ferris et al., supra note 35, at 146 (explaining that plaintiffs’ lawyers often prefer to settle 
so that they can earn substantial fees without having to risk losing the case later). 
 51 See id. (observing that because most insurance policies do not cover judgments where there is a 
determination of management dishonesty or intentional misconduct, management will structure the 
settlement in a way in which they do not admit dishonesty, and thus, are able to retain insurance cov-
erage). 
 52 See Griffith, supra note 6, at 10 (explaining that many procedural obstacles have been devel-
oped to prevent the abuse of derivative suits); Seth Aronson et al., Shareholder Derivative Actions: 
From Cradle to Grave, O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP (June 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/pdf/
clients/87654.pdf [http://perma.cc/GV4B-TMKJ] (examining many of the federal and state legal hur-
dles for derivative suits). 
 53 See Griffith, supra note 6, at 10; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2011) (requiring a 
plaintiff who brings a derivative suit to be a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the transac-
tion of which the shareholder complains); WIS. STAT. § 180.0744 (2015) (permitting board of direc-
tors to appoint a special litigation committee to recommend whether the corporation should proceed 
with a derivative action); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (a) (requiring that the plaintiff “allege with particulari-
ty the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors . . . and the 
reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or the grounds for not making the effort”). 
 54 See Adam B. Badawi, Merger Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 965, 972 (2013) (stating that, of the 1048 cases filed in 
the Chancery Court that involved fiduciary duty claims against public companies during 1999 and 
2000, 77.6% were related to acquisitions and, of the 77.6%, 94.9% were class actions); Erickson, 
supra note 37, at 1756 (explaining that derivative lawsuits were “once the cornerstone of corporate 
law,” but have been replaced by more modern means of policing corporate misconduct “such as . . . 
securities class actions”). 
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Shareholder class action lawsuits face none of the additional procedural re-
quirements placed on shareholder derivative lawsuits.55 
In shareholder class action lawsuits, unlike derivative lawsuits, share-
holders are the direct plaintiffs.56 Therefore, they sue directly on their own be-
half to defend their individual rights and those of similarly situated sharehold-
ers.57 These suits almost always allege that a corporation and its directors vio-
lated federal securities laws by making false or misleading public statements, 
so that the defendants in the class action are the corporation and its current or 
former directors.58 Any recovery goes not to the corporation, but rather to its 
shareholders.59 
The percentage of transactions targeted by class action lawsuits has 
grown rapidly over the past few years.60 Only 44% of mergers and acquisitions 
over $100 million were challenged by shareholder class actions in 2007, com-
pared to 94% in 2013.61 These lawsuits have had substantial financial impacts 
on corporations and their investors.62 Plaintiffs in merger litigation generally 
ask for equitable relief, often seeking an injunction to prevent the merger 
transaction or to revise its terms.63 The potentially disastrous impact of such 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See Garry et al., supra note 6, at 280 (noting that shareholder class actions are not subject to the 
procedural requirements of derivative suits); Griffith, supra note 6, at 10 (explaining that shareholder 
class actions do not need to satisfy the procedural hurdles that derivative suits do). 
 56 See Kahn v. Kaskel, 367 F. Supp. 784, 788–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (explaining that a shareholder 
class action is based upon individual rights belonging to each shareholder). 
 57 See id.; Garry et al., supra note 6, at 279–80 (noting that shareholder class actions are brought 
by shareholders for harm done to themselves or a collection of shareholders). 
 58 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 498 (2007) (finding that 
93% of securities class actions allege violations of Rule 10b-5, which prohibits corporations or other 
persons from making false or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity); Erickson, supra note 34, at 80 (explaining that plaintiffs in securities class actions allege that the 
corporation and its officers and directors “made false or misleading public statements” in violation of 
federal securities laws). 
 59 See Erickson, supra note 37, at 1756 (explaining that any recovery in a class action lawsuit 
goes to the shareholders); Ferris et al., supra note 35, at 146 (describing how in class action lawsuits, 
any monetary recovery will go directly to the shareholders involved); see also Arrington v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that under the general rule, 
shareholders in a securities class action “may recover the difference between the value of the consid-
eration paid and the value of the securities received, plus consequential damages that can be proven 
with reasonable certainty”). 
 60 See KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 1 (charting the percentage of deals challenged by shareholders 
between 2007 and 2013); see also Searcey & Jones, supra note 2 (stating that investors have been 
filing a growing number of lawsuits against corporations that commence major deals). 
 61 See KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 1. 
 62 See BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (finding that shareholders lose $39 billion annually upon 
the announcement of these lawsuits, compared to the average of $5 billion, after attorney’s fees, that 
investors receive as a result of lawsuit settlements). 
 63 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 565 (explaining that plaintiffs frequently ask for equitable 
relief, such as an injunction stopping the transaction or a significant revision to the deal terms); Yap et 
al., supra note 49 (noting that these lawsuits often seek to halt the transaction). 
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relief forces corporations to settle class action litigation a large majority of the 
time, as corporations often cannot complete the merger or acquisition until 
they reach a settlement.64 Additionally, corporations settle to limit the massive 
legal fees they would incur through prolonged merger litigation involving mul-
tiple class action lawsuits brought in numerous jurisdictions.65 
Few of these class action lawsuits result in any monetary award for the 
actual shareholders.66 Often, the only result of the lawsuit is that the corpora-
tion is required to disclose more information about why they entered into the 
merger or acquisition in the merger proxy.67 Other common forms of non-
monetary relief involve amendments to the merger agreement, usually the deal 
protection terms.68 
The prevalence of these “disclosure only” settlements is largely due to the 
makeup of the shareholder plaintiffs and attorneys that bring these class action 
lawsuits.69 A small number of plaintiffs’ firms specialize in shareholder class 
action lawsuits and bring most of these claims.70 When there is a merger or 
acquisition, these plaintiffs’ firms will immediately begin to recruit plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 565–66 (explaining that corporations are often forced to re-
solve claims before the merger is consummated because claims that are not resolved prior to consum-
mation may create significant ongoing liabilities); see also KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that 
in 75% of deals, litigation was over before the deal was closed); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 
477 (finding that 71.6% of transaction litigation results in some type of settlement). 
 65 See KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 1, 3 (finding that on average in 2013, M&A deals attracted 
more than five lawsuits per deal and 62% of M&A deals were litigated in more than one jurisdiction). 
 66 See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (finding that only 4.8% of merger litigation provided 
a monetary benefit to shareholders); Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 566 (explaining that few cases result 
in plaintiffs receiving a monetary recovery). 
 67 See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (finding that 55.1% of all merger litigation settle-
ments required only additional disclosures); Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 566 (explaining that a large 
majority of settlements result only in supplemental disclosures through additional information in the 
merger proxy statement); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Corporate Takeover? In 2013, a Lawsuit Almost 
Always Followed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/corporate-
takeover-in-2013-a-lawsuit-almost-always-followed/ [http://perma.cc/V4TG-V3EY] (explaining that 
disclosure-only settlements typically result only in additional disclosures in the corporation’s proxy 
statement). 
 68 See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (finding that 12.3% of settlements result in amend-
ments to a deal’s transaction terms, most commonly as a termination fee decrease); Fisch et al., supra 
note 4, at 610 (explaining that amendments to a merger agreement are often to its “deal protection” 
provisions). 
 69 See Ferris et al., supra note 35, at 146 (explaining that derivative lawsuits are brought due to 
incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel, not shareholders); Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 567 (noting that dis-
closure-only settlements are a result of America’s “financial structure” of shareholder lawsuits, where 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have their fees paid by the corporation if the suit achieves a “corporate benefit”). 
 70 See Garry et al., supra note 6, at 284 (explaining that shareholder class actions have become a 
“cottage industry for attorneys who specialize in class action litigation,” and that merger class action 
lawsuits are generally filed by an “identifiable, small group of lawyers”); Robert B. Thompson & 
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 859, 894 (2003) (observing that sixteen firms filed more than 75% of Delaware fiduciary duty 
class actions). 
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on whose behalf they can bring a class action lawsuit.71 In a large number of 
class actions, they will solicit any and all shareholders of the corporation, hop-
ing to find a poorly informed shareholder to agree to serve as plaintiff.72 Alter-
natively, they may recruit “professional” plaintiffs.73 These professional plain-
tiffs own a few shares of stock in many companies for the purpose of bringing 
these lawsuits.74 
In many cases, plaintiffs have preexisting relationships with the lawyers 
bringing the lawsuit and sometimes plaintiffs receive “bounty payments” or 
“bonuses” for their services.75 With plaintiffs serving as figureheads, class ac-
tion lawsuits are primarily lawyer-driven.76 Consequently, the shareholder 
plaintiffs, who have a minimal stake in the litigation, rarely object when their 
lawyers decide to settle in order to ensure that the legal fees will be paid by the 
defendant corporation.77 
The staggering amount of disclosure-only settlements is also a result of 
the fact that plaintiffs’ lawyers in shareholder litigation can have their fees paid 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
669, 682 (1986) (explaining that once an attorney decides to bring suit, identifying and securing a 
client is rarely a significant hurdle); Garry et al., supra note 6, at 283 (explaining that a plaintiffs’ 
lawyer will typically first find a promising lawsuit and then search for a client); Elliot J. Weiss & John 
S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency 
Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2060 (1995) (finding that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
recruit most of the investors on whose behalf they bring the class actions). 
 72 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 71, at 2060 (explaining that in many class actions, plain-
tiffs lack information about the facts and theories of their case, or are financially illiterate). 
 73 See Garry et al., supra note 6, at 281, 285 (stating that law firms still use “professional plain-
tiffs”); John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the 
Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1105 (1996) (describing how plaintiffs’ counsel generally has a 
number of “professional plaintiffs” on whose behalf it can bring suit). 
 74 See Coffee, supra note 71, at 682 (explaining that there are well-known individuals who have 
broad securities portfolios and have been lead plaintiff in numerous other class actions); R. Chris 
Heck, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the 
PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1999) (stating that professional plaintiffs often own a few 
shares in a large number of companies); Olson et al., supra note 73, at 1105 (explaining that profes-
sional plaintiffs regularly buy stock in troubled companies in order to bring a lawsuit). 
 75 See Olson et al., supra note 73, at 1105 (explaining that professional plaintiffs often receive 
“bounty payments or bonuses”); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 71, at 2060 (noting that plaintiffs in 
many class actions have a close relationship to the lawyer or firm representing them). 
 76 See Ferris et al., supra note 35, at 147 (explaining that shareholders can easily become “figure-
head plaintiffs”); Garry et al., supra note 6, at 283–84 (explaining that shareholder class actions are 
commonly criticized as being “lawyer-driven”); Jeffrey Michael Smith, Note, The Role of the Attorney 
in Protecting (and Impairing) Shareholder Interests: Incentives and Disincentives to Maximize Cor-
porate Wealth, 47 DUKE L.J. 161, 176 (1997) (explaining that throughout the suit the attorney makes 
the decisions while the plaintiff is a “mere figurehead”). 
 77 See Garry et al., supra note 6, at 284, 286 (observing that shareholders rarely object to settle-
ments due to their minimal stake in the litigation); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 71, at 2064–65 
(explaining that due to the plaintiff’s limited financial interest in the class action he or she is not likely 
to monitor their attorney’s settlement of the suit). 
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directly by the defendant corporation if the litigation results in a “corporate 
benefit.”78 Under this doctrine, Delaware law allows courts to award plaintiffs’ 
lawyers their fees, payable directly by the defendant corporation, when litiga-
tion results in non-monetary relief that will result in a benefit to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.79 This benefit, however, does not need to be mone-
tary; rather, it can be a purely informational benefit.80 Consequently, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers pursue settlement agreements that characterize their disclosure-only 
settlements as a “corporate benefit,” thereby ensuring they will be awarded 
substantial fees for their representation.81 
D. Shareholder Lawsuit Reform: Past and Present Reform Measures 
The rapid growth in the number of shareholder lawsuits has led to many 
calls for the implementation of government reform.82 With the passage of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in 1995, the federal gov-
ernment enacted legislative measures seeking to limit frivolous or unwarranted 
lawsuits.83 The PSLRA’s inability to effectively reform shareholder litigation 
abuses has consequently led multiple states, including New Jersey and Oklaho-
ma, to enact fee-shifting legislative measures in an attempt to curb the abuses.84 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 567 (explaining that plaintiffs’ counsel must portray the set-
tlement relief as a corporate benefit to recover their fees); Griffith, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining that 
under the “corporate benefit” doctrine, a plaintiffs’ attorney who achieves only non-pecuniary relief 
may still be awarded their legal fees). 
 79 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 560 (explaining that Delaware acknowledges the potential 
benefits of non-monetary relief by awarding fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys if the relief results in a corpo-
rate benefit). 
 80 See id. at 566 (explaining that a large majority of settlements result only in supplemental dis-
closures in the merger proxy statement); Solomon, supra note 67 (explaining that disclosure-only 
settlements typically result in an amendment to the company’s proxy statement). 
 81 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 567 (stating that plaintiffs’ counsel must portray the settlement 
relief as a corporate benefit to recover their fees); see also Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (not-
ing that an attorney receives an average of $749,000 in fees for disclosure-only settlements); Erickson, 
supra note 34, at 101 (explaining that plaintiffs’ attorneys generally receive between 20–30% of a 
plaintiff’s recovery); Yap et al., supra note 49 (stating that in forty cases in which shareholders re-
ceived no monetary payout, overall, lawyers received $32.4 million in fees). 
 82 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 
737–749 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7 (West 2003); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2012). 
 83 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101 (the Act sought to limit frivolous lawsuits 
by imposing a heightened pleading standard and procedural hurdles). 
 84 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7 (permitting courts to require a shareholder to pay the corpora-
tion’s legal expenses if the court determines that the plaintiffs commenced a derivative or class action 
lawsuit “without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (requir-
ing fee-shifting in all derivative lawsuits). 
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1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
The last set of major federal reforms in the area of shareholder lawsuits 
came in 1995, with the passage of the PSLRA.85 The first substantial reform of 
federal securities laws since the New Deal, the PSLRA was enacted despite a 
veto by President Bill Clinton.86 Congress designed the PSLRA to limit frivo-
lous or unwarranted lawsuits by imposing new rules on securities class action 
lawsuits.87 Despite this goal, the Act has failed to reduce the frequency of these 
lawsuits.88 In fact, after passage of the PSLRA, the number of shareholder 
class action lawsuits actually increased.89 
Without a substantive and effective federal reform for meritless share-
holder lawsuits, states and corporations have begun to take matters into their 
own hands.90 In the past, states and corporations have tried to deter frivolous 
shareholder lawsuits through heightened pleading or demand requirements, or 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101. 
 86 See id.; James A. Kassis, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Review of Its 
Key Provisions and an Assessment of Its Effects at the Close of 2001, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 
135–36 (2001) (detailing the legislative history of the PSLRA). 
 87 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101; Garry et al., supra note 6, at 293 (explain-
ing that the purpose of the PSLRA was to restrict “abusive” and “frivolous” securities litigation). The 
most notable provisions of the PSLRA included a heightened pleading standard that required plaintiffs 
to specifically identify any allegations of fraud, as well as the imposition of a stay of all discovery 
before a ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101; Kassis, 
supra note 86, at 121. The heightened pleading standard requires plaintiffs alleging that the defendant 
misrepresented or omitted a material fact to specify the supposedly misleading statements and explain 
why they are misleading. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101; Kassis, supra note 86, at 
141. Furthermore, where the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant acted with “a particular 
state of mind,” the complaint must state specific facts that support a “strong inference” that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101; 
Kassis, supra note 86, at 141. A complaint that fails to satisfy either requirement is subject to dismis-
sal. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101; Kassis, supra note 86, at 141. In addition, the 
PSLRA provides judges with the authority to determine the lead plaintiffs in a suit, and mandates that 
judges impose appropriate sanctions on attorneys or parties who filed frivolous claims. See Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101; Kassis, supra note 86, at 142–46. 
 88 See Garry et al., supra note 6, at 295–96 (noting that critics claim that the PSLRA has failed to 
create procedural hurdles that make it more difficult to bring and maintain frivolous securities cases); 
Kassis, supra note 86, at 148–49 (stating that the PSLRA has not fulfilled its goal of reducing securi-
ties litigation). 
 89 See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 913, 930 (finding an increase in lawsuits, from 183.4 annually in the five years before passage of 
the Act, to 241.5 lawsuits annually in the first six years following passage of the Act; a 32% increase 
in the number of lawsuits per year). 
 90 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7 (permitting courts to require a shareholder to pay the corpora-
tion’s legal expenses if the court determines that the plaintiffs commenced a derivative or class action 
lawsuit “without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (requir-
ing fee-shifting in all derivative lawsuits); ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556 (upholding a corporation’s fee-
shifting bylaw); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (upholding a corporation’s exclusive forum bylaw). 
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by clarifying ownership requirements.91 Recent developments have focused on 
the enactment of fee-shifting legislation and bylaws.92 
2. New Jersey and Oklahoma Enact Fee-Shifting Legislation 
Historically, corporate law has been a state issue.93 Rooted in the Ameri-
can principle of federalism, which gives states the autonomy to serve as “la-
boratories of democracy,” states have generally been free to enact corporate 
laws as they see fit, with certain areas requiring federal laws and oversight.94 
In light of the PSLRA’s inability to properly limit frivolous or unwarranted 
lawsuits, states have begun enacting dramatic measures to curb such suits.95 
Two notable examples of these measures are the fee-shifting laws passed in 
both New Jersey and Oklahoma.96 
In 2013, New Jersey enacted new, comprehensive statutory provisions re-
garding shareholder derivative and class action lawsuits.97 The laws include a 
fee-shifting provision, under which a court may require a shareholder to pay 
the corporation’s legal expenses if the court determines that the plaintiff com-
menced the proceeding without “reasonable cause” or for an “improper pur-
pose.”98 Although the provisions permit fee-shifting to plaintiffs, the provi-
sions do not require it.99 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 327 (requiring a plaintiff to own stock at the time the chal-
lenged transaction occurred); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 626(b) (2007) (requiring plaintiffs to own stock at 
the time they commence the lawsuit); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 626(c) (requiring plaintiffs to specifically 
detail the efforts they made to demand action of the board or the reasons they did not make these ef-
forts); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (requiring a plaintiff to detail in their complaint the efforts they made to 
obtain their desired action from the board). 
 92 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7; OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126; ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556; 
Boilermakers Local 154, 73 A.3d at 942. 
 93 See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 58–62; Roberta Romano, The State Competition 
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987) (describing corporate law as “the 
domain of the states”). 
 94 Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 209, 214 (2006) (explaining that corporate law is based 
on principles of federalism and is “encapsulated [by] the metaphor of the ‘states as a laboratory’”); see 
PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 25, at 58–62. 
 95 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7; OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126; see also Kassis, supra note 86, 
at 148–49 (arguing that the PSLRA has not achieved its goal of limiting the filing of meritless class 
action lawsuits). 
 96 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7 (permitting courts to require a shareholder to pay the corpora-
tion’s legal expenses if the court finds the plaintiffs commenced a derivative or class action lawsuit 
“without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (requiring fee-
shifting in all derivative lawsuits). 
 97 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7. 
 98 See id. The statute states: 
On termination of a derivative proceeding or a shareholder class action the court may: 
(1) order the corporation to pay the plaintiff’s expenses incurred in the proceeding if it 
finds that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation; (2) or-
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Similarly, on May 23, 2014, the Oklahoma State Legislature enacted a 
fee-shifting amendment to the Oklahoma General Corporation Act that applied 
to all derivative lawsuits.100 Unlike the fee-shifting provision in New Jersey, 
however, this amendment requires fee-shifting in all derivative lawsuits.101 It 
also applies to all derivative suits brought in Oklahoma, whether against a do-
mestic or foreign corporation.102 Furthermore, upon final judgment, courts will 
impose fee-shifting against the non-prevailing party, whether or not the lawsuit 
was reasonable and proper.103 This provides a degree of balance to the provi-
sion, as it also applies to the defendants, not just non-prevailing plaintiffs, and 
thereby allows successful plaintiffs the right to recover their fees and costs.104 
                                                                                                                           
der the plaintiff to pay any defendant’s expenses incurred in defending the proceeding if 
it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence by the plaintiff or without reasonable cause or for an improper pur-
pose; or (3) order a party to pay an opposing party’s expenses incurred because of the 
filing of a pleading, motion or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion or other 
paper was not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry, or warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law 
and was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary de-
lay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. 
Id. 
 99 See id. The statutory language states that courts “may” impose fee-shifting. See id. 
 100 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126. The law states: 
In any derivative action instituted by a shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, 
the court having jurisdiction, upon final judgment, shall require the non-prevailing par-
ty or parties to pay the prevailing party or parties the reasonable expenses, including at-
torney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a result of such action. 
Id. 
 101 Compare id. (“the court . . . shall require the non-prevailing party or parties to pay the prevail-
ing party or parties the reasonable expenses”) (emphasis added), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.7 
(“the court may . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 102 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126; Kevin LaCroix, Oklahoma Legislature Adopts Derivative 
Litigation Fee-Shifting Provision, D&O DIARY (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/
09/articles/corporate-governance/oklahoma-legislature-adopts-derivative-litigation-fee-shifting-
provision/ [http://perma.cc/D548-A7FQ] (stating that the Oklahoma legislation applies to any de-
rivative action in the state, even if the company involved is not an Oklahoma corporation). 
 103 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (“shall require the non-prevailing party or parties to pay the 
prevailing party or parties the reasonable expenses . . . incurred”). 
 104 See id.; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Fee Shifting in Derivative Suits and the Oklahoma Legislature, 
RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/fee-
shifting-in-derivative-suits-and-the-oklahoma-legislatur.html [http://perma.cc/MXA7-QZ2R] (ex-
plaining that there is some balance to the statute because successful shareholders are guaranteed to 
have their expenses paid by the opposing party). 
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II. SHAREHOLDER LAWSUIT REFORM: THE USE OF CORPORATE FEE-
SHIFTING BYLAWS TO DETER SHAREHOLDER LAWSUITS 
This Part examines shareholder lawsuit reform measures, focusing on the 
use and implications of allowing fee-shifting bylaws.105 Section A discusses the 
recent trend of corporations adopting or amending their bylaws in order to deter 
future shareholder lawsuits.106 Section B examines the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s approval of fee-shifting bylaws in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis 
Bund.107 Section B then analyzes the implications of the court’s decision in ATP 
Tour and considers whether it may be applicable to stock corporations.108 
A. Adopting and Amending Corporate Bylaws to Deter  
Shareholder Lawsuits 
The lack of uniform and substantive shareholder lawsuit reform has 
forced corporations themselves to take drastic measures to limit and control 
shareholder lawsuits.109 One recent trend has been for corporations to amend 
their corporate bylaws in order to limit these lawsuits.110 
Corporate bylaws set out the governing details of a corporation.111 By-
laws vary widely, but typically include the powers of directors, the procedures 
for director elections, and the procedures for holding shareholder meetings.112 
Under Delaware law, the power to adopt, amend, or repeal corporate bylaws is 
given to the shareholders.113 Nevertheless, any corporation may grant this 
power to its directors in its certificate of incorporation.114 Delaware courts 
have ruled that corporate bylaws are a binding part of the contract between a 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See infra notes 105–154 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 109–120 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 121–135 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 136–154 and accompanying text. 
 109 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014) (upholding a 
corporation’s fee-shifting bylaw); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 
942 (Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding a corporation’s exclusive forum bylaw). 
 110 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556; Boilermakers Local 154, 73 A.3d at 942. 
 111 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2015) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, 
not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corpo-
ration, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, 
directors, officers or employees.”). 
 112 See id. 
 113 Id. § 109(a) (“After a corporation other than a nonstock corporation has received any payment 
for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to 
vote.”). 
 114 Id. (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, 
confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors or, in the case of a nonstock 
corporation, upon its governing body.”). 
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Delaware corporation and its shareholders.115 Therefore, if this power is con-
ferred in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation, shareholders are on notice 
that the corporation’s board may act unilaterally to adopt bylaws addressing 
lawful subject matters.116 
Possessing such unilateral authority, the boards of some Delaware corpo-
rations have taken shareholder lawsuit reform into their own hands by adopting 
or amending their bylaws to discourage and limit shareholder suits.117 The first 
major instance of this occurred when the boards of Chevron and FedEx, both 
stock companies, adopted bylaws providing that litigation relating to their in-
ternal affairs must be conducted in Delaware.118 Shareholders immediately 
challenged the bylaws, claiming they went beyond the board’s authority under 
the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).119 In 2013, in Boilermak-
ers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., the Delaware Court of 
Chancery upheld the forum-selection bylaws, finding them both statutorily and 
contractually valid.120 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (stating “corpo-
rate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”); Centaur Partners, IV v. 
Nat’l Intergroup., Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) (stating that “corporate charters and by-laws are 
contracts among the shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation are 
held to apply”). 
 116 See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (explaining that a certificate 
of incorporation can provide directors with the power to unilaterally amend bylaws without obtaining 
shareholder approval). 
 117 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556 (upholding a corporation’s fee-shifting bylaw); Boilermakers 
Local 154, 73 A.3d at 942 (upholding a corporation’s exclusive forum bylaw). 
 118 See Boilermakers Local 154, 73 A.3d at 942. Chevron and FedEx adopted identical bylaws 
that provided: 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the 
Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) 
any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other 
employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) 
any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs 
doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares 
of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to 
the provisions of this [bylaw]. 
Id. 
 119 See id. The shareholders argued that the bylaw was statutorily invalid because it was beyond the 
board’s authority under section 109(b) of the Delaware Code to regulate an “external” matter of corpo-
rate governance rather than an “internal” matter. See id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b). 
 120 See Boilermakers Local 154, 73 A.3d at 942. The court upheld the bylaws, reasoning that the 
bylaws were statutorily valid because they govern the “rights . . . of the stockholders” and “the con-
duct of [the corporations’] affairs.” See id. at 952, 954. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the by-
laws were contractually valid because the shareholders, by purchasing stock, had agreed to be bound 
by the contractual framework outlined in the company’s certificates of incorporation and bylaws. See 
1554 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1537 
B. The Delaware Supreme Court Validates Fee-Shifting Bylaws for  
Non-Stock Corporations 
Shortly after that decision, in June 2014, in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher 
Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld another corporate bylaw 
that sought to limit the effects of frivolous shareholder litigation through a fee-
shifting provision.121 This section examines the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
ruling.122 Subsection 1 provides an overview of the procedural history of the 
case and the court’s ruling.123 Subsection 2 examines the dramatic implications 
of the ruling, including its chilling effect on both frivolous and meritorious 
lawsuits and its probable applicability to stock corporations.124  
1. ATP Tour: Background and Ruling 
In 2006, the board of ATP Tour, Inc. (“ATP”), a Delaware non-stock cor-
poration, amended its bylaws to add a fee-shifting provision that required a 
non-prevailing plaintiff in an intra-corporate dispute to reimburse the corpora-
tion for all fees and expenses the defendant(s) incurred as a result of the ac-
tion.125 The provision applied in any circumstance in which the plaintiff did 
not “obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieved, in substance 
                                                                                                                           
id. at 954–56. Those bylaws explicitly provided that shareholders would be bound by the bylaws 
adopted by the respective boards of directors. See id. 
 121 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d 557–60. 
 122 See infra notes 123–154 and accompanying text. 
 123 See infra notes 125–135 and accompanying text. 
 124 See infra notes 136–154 and accompanying text. 
 125 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556. ATP Tour, Inc. (“ATP”) operates a global professional men’s 
tennis tour. Id. The Tour’s members include both professional tennis players and organizations that 
own and operate professional tennis tournaments worldwide. Id. at 555. When two of those organiza-
tions joined the ATP they agreed “to be bound by ATP’s Bylaws, as amended from time to time.” Id. 
at 556 (quoting Certification of Questions of Law at 4, Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., No. 
07-178 (D. Del. Oct. 3, 2013)). The fee-shifting provision applies to any current or prior league mem-
ber or owner who brings suit against the ATP. See id. The amendment language, found in Article 
23.3(a), states: 
In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on their behalf 
(“Claiming Party”)] initiates or asserts any [claim or counterclaim (“Claim”)] or joins, 
offers substantial assistance to or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the 
League or any member or Owner (including any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of 
the League or any member), and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received 
substantial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party 
had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantial-
ly achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party 
shall be obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any such member 
or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description (including, but 
not limited to, all reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, 
“Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim. 
Id. 
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and amount, the full remedy sought.”126 Subsequently, two members brought 
suit against ATP alleging both federal antitrust claims and breach of fiduciary 
duty claims.127 After the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware en-
tered judgment in ATP’s favor, ATP moved to recover its legal fees under their 
fee-shifting bylaw.128 After making its way through the federal appeals pro-
cess, the case eventually came before the Delaware Supreme Court, which on 
May 8, 2014, sitting en banc, unanimously held that ATP’s fee-shifting bylaw 
was enforceable because it was both facially valid and not in conflict with Del-
aware common law.129 
The court found the bylaw lawful, explaining that corporate bylaws are 
presumed to be facially valid as long as they are authorized by Delaware Gen-
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. at 555–56. In 2007, the board of ATP voted to change the tour’s schedule. Id. at 556. 
As a result of this change, the tournament in Hamburg, Germany was demoted from the highest tour-
nament tier to the second-highest, along with a schedule change from the spring to the summer. Id. 
Consequently, two tournament entities, Deutscher Tennis Bund and Qatar Tennis Federation, brought 
suit against ATP and six of its board members in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. 
Id. ATP was successful in its breach of fiduciary duty and antitrust claims, being granted a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and winning the jury trial. Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. at 556–57, 560. Originally, the district court denied ATP’s motion, finding that federal 
law preempted Article 23.3(a), because the law prevents fee-shifting agreements in antitrust claims. 
Id. at 556. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order, 
finding that the district court should not have decided the federal preemption issue, but instead, deter-
mined whether Article 23.3(a) was enforceable under Delaware law. Id. at 556–57. On remand, find-
ing that the validity of the bylaw was an open question under Delaware law, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Delaware certified four questions for the Delaware Supreme Court concerning the 
validity of a fee-shifting provision in a Delaware non-stock corporation’s bylaws. Id. at 557. The four 
certified questions of law were: 
1. May the Board of a Delaware non-stock corporation lawfully adopt a bylaw (i) that 
applies in the event that a member brings a claim against another member, a member 
sues the corporation, or the corporation sues a member (ii) pursuant to which the claim-
ant is obligated to pay for ‘all fees, costs, and expenses of every kind and description 
(including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation expens-
es)’ of the party against which the claim is made in the event that the claimant does not 
obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, 
the full remedy sought? 
2. May such a bylaw be lawfully enforced against a member that obtains no relief at all 
on its claims against the corporation, even if the bylaw might be unenforceable in a dif-
ferent situation where the member obtains some relief? 
3. Is such a bylaw rendered unenforceable as a matter of law if one or more Board 
members subjectively intended the adoption of the bylaw to deter legal challenges by 
members to other potential corporate action then under consideration? 
4. Is such a bylaw enforceable against a member if it was adopted after the member had 
joined the corporation, but where the member had agreed to be bound by the corpora-
tion’s rules ‘that may be adopted and/or amended from time to time’ by the corpora-
tion’s Board, and where the member was a member at the time that it commenced the 
lawsuit against the corporation? 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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eral Corporation Law, are consistent with a corporation’s certificate of incorpo-
ration, and are not otherwise prohibited.130 Finding that ATP’s fee-shifting by-
law met all of these requirements, the court held the bylaw to be facially val-
id.131Additionally, the court found the bylaw was not in conflict with Delaware 
common law because, although under the “American Rule” litigants must typi-
cally pay their own legal fees, parties have always been able to contractually 
agree to modify the American Rule so that the losing party pays the prevailing 
party’s attorney’s fees and costs.132 Thus, because Delaware treats corporate 
bylaws as “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,” a fee-shifting bylaw 
falls within the contractual exception to the American Rule.133 
Although the court sanctioned corporate fee-shifting bylaws in general, it 
warned that such bylaws would not be enforced if adopted or used for an ineq-
uitable purpose.134 Ruling that the bylaw was not rendered unenforceable be-
cause it was adopted with the intention of deterring legal challenges by share-
holders, the decision provides little guidance on what factors may cause a Del-
                                                                                                                           
 130 See id. at 557–58; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any 
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation . . . .”); Crown EMAK 
Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 398 (Del. 2010) (explaining that if a bylaw is inconsistent with 
the DGCL, it is void); Frantz Mfg. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (explaining that 
corporate bylaws are presumed to be valid). 
 131 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558. The court explained that the enactment of fee-shifting bylaws 
is not prohibited by the DGCL or other Delaware statutes. Id. Additionally, the court found that fee-
shifting bylaws also meet the DGCL’s requirement that bylaws must “relate to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockhold-
ers, directors, officers or employees.” Id. Lastly, the court explained fee-shifting bylaws could be 
consistent with a corporation’s certificate of incorporation, as the charter could permit fee-shifting 
provisions, “either explicitly or implicitly by silence.” Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) 
(2011) (does not require that fee-shifting provisions be included in a corporate charter). 
 132 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558; Sternberg v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212, 1218 
(Del. 2013) (stating that the American Rule is not absolute and explaining that if contract litigation 
involves a fee-shifting provision, a judge may award all litigation costs to the prevailing party); 
Hauptman, supra note 8 (explaining that parties can contractually agree to make the losing party pay 
the prevailing party’s fees). 
 133 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558; see also Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188 (stating that a corpora-
tion’s shareholders are contractually bound by corporate charters and bylaws); Centaur Partners, IV, 
582 A.2d at 928 (explaining that the rules of contract interpretation apply to corporate charters and 
bylaws because they are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders). 
 134 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 438–39 
(Del. 1971) (refusing to enforce a board-adopted bylaw amendment moving up the date of an annual 
shareholder meeting a month earlier than originally scheduled because the board adopted the bylaw 
for the inequitable “purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders . . . to un-
dertake a proxy contest against management”); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080, 
1155 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that bylaw amendments enacted by a controlling shareholder that, 
among other changes, required a unanimous vote from the board to act on matters of importance, were 
clearly adopted for an inequitable purpose). 
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aware court to rule that a corporation adopted a fee-shifting bylaw for improp-
er purposes.135 
2. ATP Tour: Implications of the Ruling 
The ATP Tour decision had the potential to impact American corporate 
law dramatically because it occurred in Delaware.136 With approximately two-
thirds of the Fortune 500 list and over half of all U.S. public companies incor-
porated in the state, Delaware is essentially the source of the United States’ 
“de facto national corporate law.”137 Delaware has assumed this role as Ameri-
ca’s corporate law leader through its historic tradition of being at the forefront 
of corporate law, its perceived management-friendly laws, and its specialized 
corporate law judicial system.138 
If not later overruled by the Delaware State Legislature, the ruling in ATP 
Tour could have had many significant future implications on shareholder law-
suits for Delaware corporations.139 Primarily, it likely would have had a severe 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 559–60. The court reasoned that trying to deter litigation is not 
always an improper purpose because fee-shifting provisions, intrinsically, deter litigation. Id. at 560. 
Therefore, because fee-shifting bylaws are not “per se invalid,” the intent to deter litigation does not 
automatically make the bylaw unenforceable. Id. Although the court provided examples of past rul-
ings in which facially valid bylaws were ruled ineffective and unenforceable because they were enact-
ed for improper and inequitable purposes, the court was not able to analyze specifically whether 
ATP’s bylaw was adopted for a proper purpose thus making it enforceable. See id. at 558–59. This is 
because the certified questions only addressed principles of law, preventing the court from reviewing 
and ruling on the factual background of the case. See id. at 559. 
 136 See Hauptman, supra note 8 (explaining that Delaware courts create and apply standards that 
will be binding on a large number of publicly traded companies because so many of them are Dela-
ware corporations). 
 137 See John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1397 (2012), 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11027&context=ilj [http:// 
perma.cc/GTB5-PTA2] (describing Delaware courts as the source of a “de facto national corpo-
rate law” and discussing how possible shifts in venue could affect the development of corporate 
law); Liz Hoffman, Dole and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate Haven, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dole-and-other-companies-sour-on-delaware-
as-corporate-haven-1438569507 [http://perma.cc/P6G7-CUHL] [hereinafter Hoffman, Dole] 
(finding that Delaware is the legal home of 54% of public companies); Liz Hoffman, Sharehold-
er Suits May Prove Costly, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702304908304579565850165670972 [http://perma.cc/T9B9-C9L8] [hereinafter 
Hoffman, Shareholder Suits] (describing how approximately two-thirds of the Fortune 500 and 
greater than half of all U.S. public companies are Delaware corporations); Lisa A. Rickard, Del-
aware Flirts with Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-with-encouraging-shareholder-lawsuits-
1416005328?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj [http://perma.cc/R7AT-TG2Y] (noting that about two-
thirds of Fortune 500 companies are Delaware corporations). 
 138 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that businesses frequently incorporate in Del-
aware due to the state’s management-friendly laws and a court system that has unmatched corporate 
law expertise). 
 139 See Herbert Kozlov & Lawrence Reina, Delaware Supreme Court Approves Fee-Shifting Bylaw 
for Non-Stock Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY (Jun. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
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limiting effect on future shareholder lawsuits, for plaintiffs would have been 
less likely to bring such suits if they could be liable for legal fees and expenses 
incurred by the corporation should the suits prove unsuccessful.140 Further-
more, although ATP was a non-stock corporation, the court’s reasoning in up-
holding the bylaw implied that the ruling was likely applicable to stock corpo-
rations, providing public companies with the option to also adopt fee-shifting 
bylaws.141 
The scope of the bylaw upheld in ATP Tour would have further limited 
the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits.142 ATP’s bylaw imposed fee-shifting on 
any claimant that “does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially 
achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”143 The court did 
not clearly rule on how the “substantially achieves . . . the full remedy sought” 
standard should be applied.144 With no definite explanation as to what fulfills 
this burdensome standard, many shareholders would have been greatly de-
terred from bringing lawsuits out of fear that they could be liable for all fees if 
they obtain some or most of the remedies sought but fail to recover all of 
them.145 
                                                                                                                           
blt/2014/06/keeping_current_kozlov.html [http://perma.cc/GM6Z-3VS6]; Morgenson, supra note 8; 
Jonathan Starkey, Delaware Lawyers Fight Fee-shifting in Legislature, DEL. ONLINE (June 10, 2014, 
12:30 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2014/06/09/delaware-lawyers-push-bill-
protect-legal-fees/10260555/ [http://perma.cc/P3LC-4F6V]. 
 140 See Morgenson, supra note 8 (calling the fee-shifting bylaw a “nuclear weapon against share-
holders”); Starkey, supra note 139 (explaining that shareholders would be unlikely to bring litigation 
in Delaware because of the risk of a large legal bill due to fee-shifting). 
 141 See Kozlov & Reina, supra note 139 (noting that the ATP Tour decision references case law 
and relevant DGCL provisions that deal with bylaws of stock corporations); Ronald O. Mueller et al., 
Gibson Dunn Discusses Supreme Court of Delaware Case Upholding Fee-Shifting Bylaws, CLS BLUE 
SKY BLOG (May 16, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/05/16/gibson-dunn-discusses-
supreme-court-of-delaware-case-upholding-fee-shifting-bylaws/ [http://perma.cc/7G95-KJVC] (ex-
plaining that the ATP Tour decision should apply to non-stock and stock corporations because the 
DGCL cited in the case governs bylaws for both types of corporations). 
 142 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556; Hauptman, supra note 8 (stating that “no reasonable share-
holder” would bring suit under this standard because even if they are successful in court and are 
awarded damages, if the damages are “substantially” less than the amount they sought they could be 
liable for the corporation’s fees); Starkey, supra note 139 (explaining that shareholders would be 
unlikely to bring litigation in Delaware because of the risk a large legal bill due to fee-shifting). 
 143 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556. 
 144 See id.; Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App’x 124, 127 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(observing that a plaintiff who succeeds at trial and wins half of the remedy sought may still be liable 
for the defendant’s fees because the judgment arguably did not “substantially achieve[] . . . the full 
remedy sought”); Hauptman, supra note 8 (explaining that it is uncertain when plaintiffs will be “sub-
stantially successful” in their suits). 
 145 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 127 n.4. In a footnote, the court explained that 
the language of the fee-shifting provision seemed to suggest that even if a plaintiff receives a favora-
ble settlement, they may be liable for the defendant’s fees because they failed to “obtain a judgment 
on the merits.” Id. The court went on to observe that “if a plaintiff prevailed at trial and won 
$10,000,000, but sought $20,000,000,” the plaintiff could be liable for the defendant’s fees because 
the defendant could argue that the plaintiff “did not ‘substantially achieve[ ], in substance and amount, 
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The court’s ruling, when analyzed solely on the facts of the case, was lim-
ited to the enforceability of fee-shifting bylaws within the context of a non-
stock corporation.146 Some scholars and commentators, however, believed the 
ruling would also enable stock corporations to enact valid fee-shifting by-
laws.147 They noted that the court’s reasoning focused on Delaware case law 
addressing Delaware stock corporations, and the well-established theory that 
bylaws are a contract between a corporation and its shareholders.148 All of 
these factors were equally applicable to both Delaware stock and non-stock 
corporations.149 Focusing on Delaware General Corporation Law, the court 
made it clear that the law applied equally to both stock and non-stock corpora-
tions, even explicitly stating in a footnote to the case that under DGCL section 
114, all DGCL provisions that speak in terms of shareholders apply equally to 
non-stock corporations.150 Furthermore, the court relied on case law addressing 
stock corporations to explain that facially valid bylaws can be unenforceable if 
adopted or used for an improper purpose, and to explain that fee-shifting by-
laws are not per se improper because deterring litigation is a legitimate pur-
pose.151 
The deterrence effect of the ruling in ATP Tour was likely to have an even 
greater impact on shareholders of stock corporations, compared to its effects 
on shareholders of non-stock corporations, because non-stock members are 
often sophisticated parties who have the necessary financial resources to risk 
                                                                                                                           
the full remedy sought.’” Id.; see also Hauptman, supra note 8 (explaining why “no reasonable share-
holder” would bring suit under this standard). 
 146 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 555. 
 147 See Mueller et al., supra note 141 (outlining how the ATP Tour decision should apply to non-
stock and stock corporations because the DGCL equally governs bylaws for both types of corpora-
tions); Delaware Supreme Court Endorses “Fee-Shifting” Bylaw in Certified Question of Law, WIL-
SON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (May 12, 2014), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?
SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-fee-shifting.htm [http://perma.cc/ZJ27-KWQH] (ex-
plaining that the court’s analysis in ATP Tour also seems to apply to stock corporations). 
 148 See Kozlov & Reina, supra note 139 (observing that the court in ATP Tour used case law and 
DGCL provisions relating to bylaws of stock corporations to arrive at a decision); see also Airgas, 
Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188 (stating “corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s 
shareholders”). 
 149 See Kozlov & Reina, supra note 139; Mueller et al., supra note 141 (explaining that none of 
the statutes and cases the court cited apply only to non-stock corporations). 
 150 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 114 (2011); ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 557 n.10 (“Under 8 Del. C. 
§ 114, the provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law, including § 109(b), apply to non-
stock corporations and all references to the stockholders of a corporation are deemed to apply to the 
members of a non-stock corporation.”). 
 151 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558–59; Schnell, 285 A.2d at 438–39 (refusing to enforce a board-
adopted bylaw amendment in a stock corporation because the bylaw was adopted for an inequitable 
purpose); Hollinger Int’l, 844 A.2d at 1080, 1155 (holding that bylaw amendments for a stock corpo-
ration were ineffective because they were clearly adopted for an inequitable purpose). 
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bringing a lawsuit despite the possibility of fee-shifting.152 Alternatively, 
shareholders in stock corporations, who are more likely to be unsophisticated 
parties with minor financial interests, are less likely to bring a lawsuit in light 
of a fee-shifting provision.153 They would not want to risk the potentially large 
financial expense of paying the defendant corporation’s legal fees and expens-
es in order to recover a minimal financial return.154 
III. THE DELAWARE STATE LEGISLATURE’S RESPONSE TO ATP TOUR, INC. 
V. DEUTSCHER TENNIS BUND: STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF  
FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS FOR STOCK CORPORATIONS 
This Part explores the Delaware State Legislature’s response to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 
along with the legislature’s subsequent statutory prohibition of fee-shifting 
bylaws for Delaware stock corporations.155 Section A reviews the support and 
opposition of different interest groups to the ATP Tour ruling.156 Section B 
provides an overview of the legislative history leading to the Delaware State 
Legislature’s approval of the fee-shifting bylaw prohibition.157 Section C ex-
amines the ambiguity of the statutory language of the fee-shifting prohibition 
and whether the prohibition is applicable to securities class actions.158 
A. Support and Opposition to the ATP Tour Decision 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in ATP Tour immediately generat-
ed a great deal of outspoken support and opposition.159 Corporations, corporate 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556–60. This was the case in ATP Tour, where Deutscher Tennis 
Bund and Qatar Tennis Federation’s large financial interests, and great sophistication and financial 
resources, allowed them to bring suit despite their knowledge of the possibility of having to pay 
ATP’s fees if they were unsuccessful. See id.; see also William J. Sushon et al., Shifting Sands: Prac-
tical Advice on Delaware Fee-Shifting Bylaws, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 2014, at 8, 9 (describing how the 
parties in ATP Tour were likely not deterred by the fee-shifting provision because they were “substan-
tial entities”). 
 153 See Morgenson, supra note 8 (describing how shareholders lacking financial resources might 
be discouraged from bringing lawsuits if they know they will have to pay their opponents’ legal fees if 
the suit is unsuccessful). 
 154 See id.; Sushon et al., supra note 152, at 8–9 (arguing that the fear of fee-shifting liability 
would preclude many shareholders in stock corporations from bringing a lawsuit); Hoffman, Share-
holder Suits, supra note 137 (stating that a plaintiff who owns only 1% of a corporation’s stock could 
receive 1% of any recovery if their suit is successful, but could be liable for 100% of the defendant’s 
costs if the suit is unsuccessful). 
 155 See infra notes 156–189 and accompanying text. 
 156 See infra notes 159–165 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 166–175 and accompanying text. 
 158 See infra notes 176–189 and accompanying text. 
 159 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014); Alison Frankel, 
Big Pension Funds Mobilize Against Delaware Fee-Shifting Clauses, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/11/26/big-pension-funds-mobilize-against-delaware-fee-
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interest groups, and even legal reform groups were particularly supportive of 
the ruling.160 Corporations showed their support by adopting fee-shifting by-
laws, as more than forty companies adopted similar bylaws by the end of 
2014.161 In addition, interest groups expressed their support by sending letters 
to the Delaware General Assembly, arguing that fee-shifting bylaws protect 
shareholders against the significant costs of frivolous and abusive litigation.162 
At the same time, the ruling also generated a great deal of opposition, 
primarily from large institutional investors, pension funds, and the interest 
groups that represent them.163 These interest groups strongly lobbied the Del-
aware State Legislature and sent letters to Delaware Governor Jack Markell, 
urging him to support legislative action to keep corporations from adopting 
fee-shifting bylaws.164 These interest groups also reached out to proxy adviso-
                                                                                                                           
shifting-clauses/ [http://perma.cc/73FM-EKRX] (detailing both support and opposition by various 
interest groups to the ATP Tour decision); Kevin LaCroix, Battle Builds in Delaware Over Fee-
Shifting Bylaws, D&O DIARY (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/12/articles/director-
and-officer-liability/battle-builds-in-delaware-over-fee-shifting-bylaws/ [http://perma.cc/UBC7-G53F] 
(further describing support and opposition to the ATP Tour decision); Francis Pileggi, Delaware Pro-
poses New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COMM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 
2015), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-proposes-new-fee-
shifting-and-forum-selection-legislation/ [http://perma.cc/59RZ-CDGA] (explaining that the Delaware 
legislation faced “powerful lobbyists” representing both sides of the issue). 
 160 See Liz Hoffman, Delaware Fight Over Corporate Legal Bills on Hold, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(June 18, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/06/18/delaware-fight-over-corporate-legal-bills-on-
hold/ [http://perma.cc/47D8-N6B5] (reporting that Dole Food Co. has expressed support for the deci-
sion); LaCroix, supra note 159 (stating that the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform supports the 
ruling); Jonathan Starkey, Chamber Forces Delay on Fee-shifting Legislation, DEL. ONLINE (June 10, 
2014, 1:52 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2014/06/10/fee-shifting-
bill/10280791/ [http://perma.cc/32TE-NSKA] (describing how support for the ruling has also come 
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
 161 See Lee Rudy, Litigation Bylaws, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS (Nov. 19, 2014), http://
www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/legal_issues/Litigation%20Bylaws.pdf [http://perma.cc/83PY-
W5FG] (providing a list of stock corporations that have already adopted fee-shifting bylaws). 
 162 See Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Members 
of the Del. Gen. Assembly (June 9, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1184978-
chamber-letter-to-lawmakers.html [http://perma.cc/55RX-QSRL]; Letter from Andrew Wynne, Dir., 
State Legislative Affairs, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Bryan Townsend, Senator, Del. 
State Legislature (June 5, 2014), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1184979-chamber-letter-
to-townsend.html [http://perma.cc/ET2Q-G9BY]. 
 163 See Frankel, supra note 159 (detailing the opposition efforts of institutional investors); 
Michael Greene, Investor Group Joins Chorus Against Fee-Shifting Bylaws, Asks Del. Bar to Act, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.bna.com/investor-group-joins-n17179917697/ 
[http://perma.cc/7WEM-RLV3] (describing opposition efforts by the Council of Institutional Inves-
tors); Investors Try to Undo Damage in Delaware, as Eager Companies Shift Costs of Lawsuits to 
Plaintiffs, BERMAN DEVALERIO (Nov. 2014), http://www.bermandevalerio.com/9-news/recent-
developments/243-investors-try-to-undo-damage-in-delaware-as-eager-companies-shift-costs-of-
lawsuits-to-plaintiffs [http://perma.cc/ESY7-UWYK] [hereinafter BERMAN DEVALERIO] (detailing 
the opposition of institutional investors to the ATP Tour decision). 
 164 BERMAN DEVALERIO, supra note 163 (stating that “20 institutional investors with nearly $2 
trillion in assets under management wrote Delaware Gov. Jack Markell” asking him to take action 
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ry services ISS and Glass Lewis and urged them to adopt policies opposing 
corporate adoption of fee-shifting bylaws or charters.165 
B. Prohibition of Fee-Shifting Bylaws: Legislative History and Approval 
The Delaware Corporate Law Council, in conjunction with the Delaware 
State Legislature, agreed with those who sought to limit or overrule ATP Tour 
and began working on an amendment to the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (“DGCL”) immediately after the ATP Tour decision.166 On May 22, 2014, 
the Delaware Corporate Law Council proposed an amendment to the Delaware 
General Corporation Laws that would restrict the ATP Tour ruling to its specif-
ic facts by only allowing non-stock corporations, not stock corporations, to 
adopt fee-shifting bylaws.167 After direct opposition from lobbying groups in-
cluding the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Chamber Institute for 
Legal Reform, however, the legislature ultimately decided to table the bill until 
the 2015 legislative session.168 This decision was made in order to provide the 
representatives of the Delaware State Bar with more time to study the use of 
                                                                                                                           
against fee-shifting bylaws); see Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Inst. Inv’rs, to 
Norman Monhait, Chairman, Section of Corp. Law Del. State Bar Ass’n (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/11_25_14_CII_letter_DCC.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U3KN-3D76]; see also Hazel Bradford, Institutional Investors Team up Against Del-
aware Court Ruling on Legal Fees, PENSIONS & INVS. (Dec. 3, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://www.pionline
.com/article/20141203/ONLINE/141209953/institutional-investors-team-up-against-delaware-court-
ruling-on-legal-fees [http://perma.cc/68XV-4A9X] (describing a letter that the National Conference 
on Public Employee Retirement Systems and eight unions sent to Governor Markell expressing their 
opposition to fee-shifting bylaws). Opposition to fee-shifting bylaws came from both national and 
international institutional investors; “state pension funds of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Flori-
da, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina and Oregon, city pension funds in Houston, New York 
and San Diego, the Middlesex County Retirement System and three Dutch asset managers” were 
among the twenty institutional investors that cosigned the letter to the Governor. See BERMAN DEVA-
LERIO, supra note 163. 
 165 See BERMAN DEVALERIO, supra note 163 (noting that these letters asked the proxy advisory 
services to oppose bylaw or charter provisions that exposed shareholders to liability for the corpora-
tion’s legal expenses). 
 166 See S.B. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014); Starkey, supra note 139 (stating that lawyers 
immediately began drafting legislation to overrule the ATP Tour decision). 
 167 See S.B. 236. The proposed amendment, section 331, “Monetary Liability of Stockholders,” 
stated, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, neither the certificate of incorporation 
nor the bylaws of any corporation may impose monetary liability, or responsibility for any debts of the 
corporation, on any stockholder of the corporation, except to the extent permitted by Sections 
102(b)(6) and 202 of this title.” Id. 
 168 See Hoffman, supra note 160 (detailing how the Delaware legislature postponed legislative 
action until early 2015); Kevin LaCroix, Delaware Legislative Proposal to Restrict Fee-Shifting By-
laws Held Over to Next Year, D&O DIARY (June 23, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/
06/articles/corporate-governance/delaware-legislative-proposal-to-restrict-fee-shifting-bylaws-held-
over-to-next-year/ [http://perma.cc/YV7V-7RDP] (detailing the legislative decision to postpone legis-
lative action on fee-shifting bylaws until 2015). 
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fee-shifting bylaws and to allow supporting and opposing sides the ability to 
further study and present their arguments.169 
This delay had little effect: at the start of the 2015 legislative session the 
legislature once again sided with opponents of fee-shifting and approved a 
statutory prohibition against fee-shifting bylaws.170 After receiving near unan-
imous approval in the Delaware legislature, on June 24, 2015, Governor 
Markell signed the statutory prohibition against fee-shifting bylaws for stock 
corporations into law.171 Although the law does not explicitly overrule the ATP 
Tour decision, it does prohibit Delaware stock corporations from adopting fee-
shifting bylaws or certificate of incorporation provisions.172 The prohibition 
amends sections 102 and 109 of the DGCL to provide that a Delaware corpora-
tion’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws “may not contain any provision 
that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses 
of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate 
claim.”173 The law applies only to Delaware stock corporations, so that the 
ATP Tour decision is still applicable to non-stock corporations.174 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See Peter A. Atkins et al., Fee-Shifting Bylaws: The Current State of Play, SKADDEN, ARPS, 
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (June 20, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/news
letters/Fee-Shifting_Bylaws_The_Current_State_of_Play.pdf [http://perma.cc/7N66-DHEA] (explain-
ing that the legislature urged parties to continue to study use of fee-shifting bylaws and alternative 
solutions); LaCroix, supra note 168 (explaining that the legislature called upon “the Delaware State 
Bar Association, its Corporation Law Section, and the Council of that Section” to continue to examine 
whether fee-shifting legislation should be adopted in 2015). 
 170 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (West 2015); A.W. Chip Phinney III, Delaware 
Bans Corporate Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Authorizes Delaware-Only Forum Requirement for Intra-
Corporate Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (July 6, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/delaware-
bans-corporate-fee-shifting-bylaws-and-authorizes-delaware-only-forum-requi [http://perma.cc/UH5K
-N4MP] (detailing Delaware’s approval of the fee-shifting prohibition). 
 171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f) (West 2015); id. § 109(b). The Delaware Senate passed 
the bill with sixteen “yes” votes and five “no” votes. SB 75, Delaware Senate Bill, An Act to Amend 
Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, OPENSTATES.ORG, http://
openstates.org/de/bills/148/SB75/ [http://perma.cc/BAS9-EP84] The Delaware House of Representa-
tives unanimously passed the bill. See id. 
 172 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b). 
 173 See id. § 102(f) (“The certificate of incorporation may not contain any provision that would 
impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other 
party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”); id. § 109(b) 
(“The bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the at-
torneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate 
claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”). 
 174 See id. §§ 102(f), 109(b); see also Matthew M. Greenberg et al., Delaware Legislature Pro-
hibits Fee Shifting and Authorizes Exclusive Forum Selection, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (July 29, 
2015), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/delaware-legislature-prohibits-fee-shifting-and-auth
orizes-exclusive-forum-selection-2015-07-29/ [http://perma.cc/44QV-8AT8] (explaining that the new 
legislation limits the ATP Tour ruling to non-stock corporations); Kevin M. LaCroix, Delaware Legisla-
ture Passes Fee-Shifting Bylaw Prohibition—What Questions Remain?, D&O DIARY (June 14, 2015), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2015/06/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/delaware-legislature-
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the law does not forbid fee-shifting terms in shareholder agreements or other 
private agreements between corporations and shareholders.175 
C. Uncertainty Surrounding “Internal Corporate Claims” and Securities 
Class Action Lawsuits 
Despite passage of Delaware’s fee-shifting bylaw prohibition, uncertainty 
still remains as to the scope of the prohibition, specifically whether the prohi-
bition applies to securities class action lawsuits.176 This uncertainty stems from 
the fact that the statutory language prohibits fee-shifting specifically “in con-
nection with an internal corporate claim.”177 Section 115 of the DGCL defines 
“internal corporate claims” to mean “claims, including claims in the right of 
the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or 
former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity . . . .”178 
This definition may not encompass securities class actions, which are not 
required to claim a breach of fiduciary duty.179 Rather, they often allege only a 
material misstatement or omission by a director or officer, without asserting a 
                                                                                                                           
passes-fee-shifting-bylaw-prohibition-what-questions-remain/ [http://perma.cc/9RBW-WZYN] (noting 
that the new legislative restrictions will not apply to non-stock corporations). 
 175 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); see also Greenberg, supra note 174 (explaining 
that the legislation will not prevent fee-shifting in “stockholder agreements or other private agree-
ments between stockholders and corporations”). 
 176 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); John C. Coffee, Jr., Update on “Loser Pays” 
Fee Shifting, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 27, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/
05/27/update-on-loser-pays-fee-shifting/ [http://perma.cc/AX2L-63KH] (arguing that the fee-shifting 
prohibition may not cover securities class action lawsuits); Neil J. Cohen, Does Delaware Bill 75 
Cover Fee Shifting in Securities Cases?, BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP., June 2015, at 7, 7–10 
(explaining that it is possible for the fee-shifting prohibition to be interpreted so as not to apply to 
securities class actions); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Norman M. Monhait, Fee-Shifting Bylaws: A 
Study in Federalism, INST. DEL. CORP. & BUS. L. (June 29, 2015), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/
delcorp/2015/06/29/fee-shifting-bylaws-a-study-in-federalism/#sthash.WTx3qqji.MWrWpZaX.dpbs 
[http://perma.cc/ASR5-9KEQ] (arguing that the legislation does not address the validity of fee-
shifting bylaws in securities class actions). 
 177 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b), 115; Coffee, supra note 176 (explaining that the 
definition of “internal corporate claims” in section 115 does not clearly cover securities class actions); 
Cohen, supra note 176, at 7 (explaining that plaintiffs are likely to question whether section 115, 
which defines “internal corporate claim,” exempts securities class actions). 
 178 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115; Coffee, supra note 176. This definition covers “derivative 
actions, merger class actions based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Weinberger or 
similar breach of fiduciary duty claims, and appraisal actions.” See Coffee, supra note 176; see also 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (establishing that when there is a control-
ling shareholder who consummates a merger or acquisition, the concept of fairness involves fair deal-
ing and fair price). 
 179 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Staying in the Delaware Corporate 
Governance Lane: Fee Shifting Bylaws and a Legislative Reaffirmation of the Rules of the Road, 
BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP., June 2015, at 12, 12–13 (explaining that securities class action 
claims are not always based on a breach of duty by directors and officers); Coffee, supra note 176 
(explaining that federal securities class actions assert a material misstatement or omission claim, but 
are not required to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim). 
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breach of fiduciary duty claim.180 Thus, without a claim “based upon a viola-
tion of a duty,” it is possible that a Delaware court could interpret the statutory 
language to allow fee-shifting bylaws that cover securities class actions.181 
Some commentators acknowledge this statutory ambiguity, but they argue 
that a closer reading of the statutory language shows that the new fee-shifting 
prohibition does cover securities class actions.182 These commentators empha-
size that the statute defines “internal corporate claims” as “claims, including 
claims in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a 
duty . . . .”183 They argue that if securities class actions were meant to be spe-
cifically excluded from the fee-shifting prohibition, the statute would have de-
fined internal corporate claims as “claims in the right of the corporation.”184 
Instead, by broadly defining claims as “including claims in the right of the 
corporation,” these commentators believe that the statute implicitly covers se-
curities class actions.185 Second, these commentators note that the statute’s 
language is not restricted to claims alleging “a violation of a duty,” but instead 
covers claims “based upon a violation of a duty.”186 Therefore, they argue the 
statute covers securities fraud class actions because, although such claims are 
not a direct violation of a duty, they are based upon a violation of a director’s 
or officer’s duty of loyalty not to violate the law.187 Lastly, because the lan-
                                                                                                                           
 180 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Delaware Throws a Curveball, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/03/16/delaware-throws-a-curveball [http://perma.cc/T27U-
UHZC] (explaining that federal securities class actions must allege a material misstatement or omis-
sion but do not need to allege a violation of a duty); Hamermesh & Monhait, supra note 176 (explain-
ing that securities class actions based on § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the most common 
type of suit, generally involve allegations of a material misstatement or omission by directors or offic-
ers, which do not arise from their duty to the corporation and its shareholders). 
 181 See Brown, supra note 179, at 13–14 (arguing that the fee-shifting prohibition does cover 
securities class actions because it is preempted by federal law); Coffee, supra note 176 (arguing that 
ambiguity of the “internal corporate claims” definition could lead to securities class actions being 
exempt from the fee-shifting prohibition); Coffee, supra note 180 (explaining that fee-shifting bylaws 
in a federal securities class action might not be prohibited if the action does not claim a “violation of a 
duty” by officers or directors). 
 182 See Cohen, supra note 176, at 7–10 (arguing that the statutory language should be interpreted 
broadly so as to include securities class actions). 
 183 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (emphasis added). 
 184 See id.; Cohen, supra note 176, at 8 (arguing that section 115 was not designed to exclude 
securities lawsuits because it did not define internal corporate claims as exclusively “claims in the 
right of the corporation”). 
 185 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (emphasis added); Cohen, supra note 176, at 8 (arguing that 
because the definition uses the language “including claims in the right of the corporation,” the drafter 
purposefully left room for securities class actions to be covered). 
 186 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (emphasis added); Cohen, supra note 176, at 8 (explaining 
that the language of section 115 is “not restricted to claims alleging ‘a violation of a duty’; rather, it 
includes claims ‘based on a violation of a duty’”). 
 187 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115; Cohen, supra note 176, at 8–9 (arguing that securities class 
actions fit within the definition in section 115 because they are “based on a violation of a corporate 
officer’s duty to loyally obey the law on behalf of his employer”). 
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guage does not limit the prohibition to claims under Delaware law, the defini-
tion could have been drafted to provide Delaware courts with the flexibility to 
find that federal securities class actions are covered by the statutory prohibi-
tion.188 
Despite these contrasting beliefs on whether the law covers securities 
class actions there is a general consensus that unless the statutory language is 
amended, the issue of whether the fee-shifting prohibition applies to securities 
class actions will have to be decided by the Delaware courts.189 
IV. ALLOWING FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS WITH LIMITATIONS THAT PROTECT 
BOTH SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATIONS 
Given the negative impact of shareholder lawsuits, Delaware’s legislature 
and judiciary should strive to limit the number of frivolous shareholder claims, 
in particular, securities class action claims.190 Section A proposes that Delaware 
amend the statute that prohibits fee-shifting bylaws to allow stock corporations 
to adopt fee-shifting bylaws subject to two key limitations.191 Section B argues 
that courts should read the existing statute narrowly so that it does not apply to 
securities class action lawsuits, and argues that the legislature should ultimately 
amend the statute so that it does not apply to securities class action lawsuits.192 
A. Allowing Stock Corporations to Adopt Fee-Shifting Bylaws 
The Delaware State Legislature should amend its fee-shifting prohibition to 
explicitly allow stock corporations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws.193 The abusive 
and costly trend of lawsuits following a merger or acquisition must be 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115; Cohen, supra note 176, at 9 (arguing that because section 
115 does not limit claims under Delaware law, it “could have been deliberately worded to leave 
enough room for the Delaware courts to find that securities fraud cases are covered”). 
 189 See Coffee, supra note 176 (explaining that it is probable that the Delaware courts will soon 
have to determine whether the fee-shifting prohibition applies to securities class actions); Cohen, 
supra note 175, at 9–10 (explaining that the outlook for the fee-shifting prohibition likely involves 
Delaware courts deciding whether the prohibition applies to securities class actions). 
 190 See infra notes 191–247 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 193–220 and accompanying text. 
 192 See infra notes 221–247 and accompanying text. 
 193 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(f), 109(b), 115 (West 2015); see also Stephen Bainbridge, 
The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Ordered Solution to the Shareholder Litiga-
tion Epidemic, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-case-for-allowing-fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-privately-ordered-
solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat.html [http://perma.cc/R7F4-9Z9B] (arguing that the Delaware legis-
lature should not ban fee-shifting bylaws); John O. McGinnis, Let Corporations Shift Fees in Share-
holder Suits, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/10/28/let-
corporations-shift-fees-in-shareholder-suits/ [http://perma.cc/3HWD-Y9HH] (arguing that fee-shifting 
bylaws should not be prohibited); Rickard, supra note 137 (arguing that, at a minimum, corporations 
should have the option to adopt fee-shifting bylaws). 
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stopped.194 The current Delaware fee-shifting legislation does little, if anything, 
to curtail this practice.195 By prohibiting stock corporations from adopting fee-
shifting bylaws for internal corporate claims, and possibly for securities class 
actions, the Delaware legislature is allowing this harmful trend to continue.196 
The legislature should allow the use of fee-shifting bylaws, but it should 
impose two important limits on this practice by requiring shareholder approval 
for fee-shifting bylaws and imposing a maximum relief standard.197 Requiring 
shareholder approval would address concerns that fee-shifting bylaws are inequi-
table, for the Delaware judicial system has a long-standing tradition of finding 
that shareholder approval via informed voting overcomes any allegations of a 
board or corporation’s misconduct.198 Although such a requirement would trans-
fer considerable power to the proxy advisory services, which generally have 
reacted negatively to the adoption of bylaws that could potentially limit share-
holder rights, this risk must be born by the corporation for the sake of fair-
                                                                                                                           
 194 See BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (finding that shareholders lose $34 billion annually when 
class action lawsuits are announced); KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that in 2013, 94% of 
deals over $100 million were challenged by at least one lawsuit). 
 195 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); see also Benjamin Horney, Delaware’s 2015 
Dominated by Fee-Shifting Fervor, LAW360 (July 1, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/673991/delaware-s-2015-dominated-by-fee-shifting-fervor [http://perma.cc/X2MC-GXN3] (discuss-
ing a Delaware lawyer’s belief that the fee-shifting bylaw legislation will not resolve the problem of 
frivolous shareholder lawsuits); Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal 
Reform, to Norman Monhait, Chairman, Section of Corp. Law Dela. State Bar Ass’n (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/de-bar-letter-4_8_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DZ3Z-WTZG] (explaining that the fee-shifting bill “does little to address the well-documented, 
longstanding problem of abusive merger-and-acquisition litigation in Delaware,” and “removes a 
useful tool for protecting innocent shareholders against these frivolous lawsuits”). 
 196 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); Horney, supra note 195 (discussing a Delaware 
lawyer’s belief that the fee-shifting bylaw legislation simply returned Delaware to where it was prior 
to the ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund decision, “when shareholder suits ran rampant”). 
 197 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Loser Pays”: Who Will Be the Biggest Loser?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/11/24/loser-pays-who-will-be-the-biggest-
loser/ [http://perma.cc/ZE5W-3N3G] (suggesting that Delaware could allow fee-shifting provisions to 
be adopted only after they are approved by shareholder vote); Neil J. Cohen, Who Should Oversee 
Fee-Shifting Bylaws: The Shareholders, the Courts, the Legislature, or All Three?, 38 SEC. REFORM 
ACT LITIG. REP. 22, 25 (2015), http://www.lawreporters.com/jan15sra.pdf [http://perma.cc/YH3F-
LEQ9] (suggesting that proposed fee-shifting bylaws should be submitted to a shareholder vote); 
Theodore N. Mirvis & William Savitt, Shifting the Focus: Let the Courts Decide, 38 SEC. REFORM 
ACT LITIG. REP. 11, 13 (2015), http://www.lawreporters.com/jan15sra.pdf [http://perma.cc/YH3F-
LEQ9] (explaining that proposed maximum relief standards could include a corporation being unable 
to impose fee-shifting liability if a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss or if the plaintiff continues 
through discovery); Starkey, supra note 139 (explaining that the burdensome fee-shifting language 
approved in ATP Tour could force shareholders not to bring lawsuits in Delaware due to a large risk 
of liability); Sushon et al., supra note 152, at 9 (suggesting that boards submit fee-shifting bylaws to a 
shareholder vote). 
 198 See Sushon et al., supra note 152, at 9. This tradition is premised on the simple fact that it is 
extremely difficult for a shareholder to argue that a bylaw is inequitable if the majority of the corpora-
tion’s shareholders approved it. See id. 
1568 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1537 
ness.199 Moreover, shareholders might approve fee-shifting bylaws because they 
may recognize that the net benefit of deterring many frivolous shareholder law-
suits is worth any potential chilling effect that such bylaws may have on a small 
number of meritorious lawsuits.200 
The Delaware State Legislature should prohibit corporations from using 
language similar to “does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially 
achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”201 As previously 
discussed, this harsh language could essentially require a claimant to achieve the 
full remedy sought in order to avoid liability for the defendant’s fees.202 Thus, 
even if the claimant wins the lawsuit and a large portion of the remedy sought, 
they could still be liable for the defendant’s fees because it was not the “full 
remedy sought.”203 
Instead, the Delaware legislature should create a maximum standard that 
corporations can impose on claimants in order for them to avoid liability for the 
defendant corporation’s fees.204 Significantly lower than ATP Tour, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See Ariel J. Deckelbaum et al., ISS and Glass Lewis Issue 2015 Proxy Voting Policies, PAUL, 
WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.paulweiss.com/media/
2703532/11oct14alert.pdf [http://perma.cc/VDL7-AGH8] (explaining that both ISS and Glass Lewis 
added policies against boards unilaterally adopting fee-shifting bylaws); see also James Woolery, 
Boards Should Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Oct. 31, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/31/boards-should-minimize-the-
role-of-proxy-advisors/ [http://perma.cc/2MV4-TMP5] (explaining that ISS and Glass Lewis, the two 
primary proxy advisors, influence approximately 38% of shareholder votes at U.S. public company 
meetings). Although there is a possibility that shareholders will just follow the recommendations of the 
proxy advisory services to reject the fee-shifting provisions, there is also a possibility that this vote will 
bring to light the rampant abuse and extreme costs of shareholder lawsuits. See BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 
5, at 7 (describing the extreme costs of shareholder lawsuits, including a study finding that 1456 set-
tled securities class action cases, filed over an eighteen-year period from December 1995 through 
January 2014, resulted in an estimated $262 billion in shareholder losses). 
 200 See BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (finding that shareholders lose $39 billion annually when 
these lawsuits are announced, compared to the average of $5 billion—after attorney’s fees—that in-
vestors receive as a result of lawsuit settlements). 
 201 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014); Starkey, supra 
note 139 (explaining that the burdensome fee-shifting language approved in ATP Tour could force 
shareholders not to bring lawsuits in Delaware due to the large risk of liability). 
 202 See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App’x 124, 127 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Hauptman, supra note 8 (explaining that “no reasonable shareholder[s]” would bring suit under this 
standard because even if they are successful in court and are awarded damages, if the damages are 
“substantially” less than the amount they sought, they could be liable for the corporation’s fees). 
 203 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 127 n.4 (explaining that “if a plaintiff prevailed 
at trial and won $10,000,000, but sought $20,000,000, this by-law theoretically could require the 
plaintiff to pay the defendant’s fees because the judgment the plaintiff received arguably did not ‘sub-
stantially achieve . . . the full remedy sought’”); Hauptman, supra note 8 (explaining that a plaintiff 
who wins “one out of three claims, or obtain[s] a judgment for $1 million out of $3 million sought” 
might still be liable for fee-shifting because the plaintiff was not “substantially” successful). 
 204 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 128; Cohen, supra note 197, at 24 (arguing that 
the legislature should not allow fee-shifting if a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss or achieves “a 
significant financial or corporate governance remedy”); Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 197, at 13 (ex-
2015] Permitting Fee-Shifting Bylaws for Delaware Corporations 1569 
Deutscher Tennis Bund’s “full remedy sought” standard, the standard should 
state that if a claimant is able to achieve any relief that is greater than minimal 
disclosures then they are not subject to liability for the defendant’s legal fees.205 
The traditional “American Rule” would then apply and all parties involved 
would pay their own legal fees and expenses.206 This modified application of the 
American Rule will not discourage legitimate claims by shareholders because 
the “corporate benefit” doctrine will still apply.207 Thus, by receiving relief that 
is greater than minimal disclosures, the defendant corporation would pay its own 
attorney’s fees even without monetary relief.208 
This standard should be greater than minimal disclosures, so as to deter 
frivolous lawsuits whose only purpose often is to receive minimal disclosures 
from the corporation.209 This is because doing so still allows the plaintiff’s attor-
neys to achieve a “corporate benefit” and thus have their fees paid directly by 
the defendant corporation.210 Determining what relief is greater than minimum 
disclosures should be left to the judiciary to determine on a case-by-case ba-
sis.211 Additionally, this standard should also be applied to settlements.212 
                                                                                                                           
plaining that proposed maximum relief standards include a corporation being unable to impose fee-
shifting liability if a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss or if the plaintiff continues through discov-
ery). 
 205 See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556. 
 206 See Mahani v. Edix Media Grp., Inc., 935 A.2d 242, 245 (Del. 2007) (explaining that under 
the American Rule litigants pay their own litigation costs). 
 207 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 567 (noting that plaintiffs’ counsel must portray the settle-
ment relief as a corporate benefit in order to recover their fees). 
 208 See id. at 560 (explaining that Delaware acknowledges the potential benefits of non-monetary 
relief by awarding fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys if the relief results in a corporate benefit); Griffith, 
supra note 6, at 2 (describing how under the “corporate benefit” doctrine, a plaintiffs’ attorney may 
recover their fees even if they only achieve non-pecuniary relief). 
 209 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 567 (stating that Delaware law incentivizes “litigants to gen-
erate, and judges to reward, throwaway disclosures” that are unimportant to shareholders and whose 
only purpose is to end litigation); Solomon, supra note 67 (explaining that in 2012, approximately 
85% of settlements were solely disclosures). 
 210 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 567 (explaining that plaintiffs’ counsel must portray the set-
tlement relief as a corporate benefit in order to recover their fees); Griffith, supra note 6, at 2 (describ-
ing how under the “corporate benefit” doctrine, a plaintiffs’ attorney who only achieves non-pecuniary 
relief may still be awarded their legal fees). 
 211 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 591–604 (proposing that Delaware courts reject arguments 
that disclosure-only settlements provide a “corporate benefit,” thus preventing the award of attorney’s 
fees); Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 197, at 15 (explaining that if the validity of fee-shifting provisions 
were left up to the Delaware courts, the courts would be able to prevent unfair fee-shifting by deter-
mining when the plaintiff achieved a meaningful result, even if it was not the full remedy the plaintiff 
had sought). 
 212 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 562 (explaining that settlements often consist of only “throw-
away disclosures”). Courts must approve the termination of a merger class action lawsuit by settle-
ment. See id. at 568; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval for compromise of a class ac-
tion). The court’s primary role at a settlement hearing is to determine whether the settlement is fair 
and reasonable and to determine the fees to be awarded to plaintiff’s counsel. See Fisch et al., supra 
note 4, at 558. In order to deter frivolous lawsuits properly, it is imperative that fee-shifting provisions 
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This lower standard is primarily justified for two reasons.213 First, and most 
importantly, the standard will continue to provide shareholders with incentives to 
bring meritorious lawsuits against corporations.214 Shareholders will still be in-
centivized because meritorious suits have, at the very least, a high probability 
that they will achieve relief that is greater than minimal disclosures.215 Thus, in a 
large majority of meritorious cases, if not all, the shareholders will not be subject 
to fee-shifting.216 
Second, it is extremely hard for a claimant to achieve the full remedy 
sought.217 Generally, even when claimants decisively win a lawsuit, they will not 
receive the entirety of the remedy sought.218 If the “full remedy sought” standard 
were used, then claimants may be inclined to seek less than the actual amount of 
damages they incurred to ensure a greater likelihood of meeting this difficult 
standard.219 In a judicial system based upon the theory of restitution, discourag-
ing claimants from seeking to recover the entirety of their actual damages is not 
good judicial policy.220 
                                                                                                                           
are applied to settlement agreements because a large majority of shareholder lawsuits end with disclo-
sure-only settlements. See KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 4 (finding that in 88% of merger cases filed in 
2013, the settlement only resulted in disclosures); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 477 (finding that 
71.6% of transaction litigations result in some type of settlement). By ensuring that these settlements 
end with more than just minimal disclosures, it will prevent plaintiffs’ lawyers from developing the po-
tential loophole of bringing frivolous lawsuits just to settle them and recover their fees. See Joy v. North, 
692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the true motivators behind derivative actions are plain-
tiffs’ attorneys who hope to recover large fees). 
 213 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 127 n.4; John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the 
SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private Enforcement?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-it-still-believe-in-private
-enforcement/ [http://perma.cc/38X3-C2NG] (explaining that it is rare for plaintiffs to win every 
claim, making it highly unlikely that they could achieve the full remedy sought). 
 214 See Starkey, supra note 139 (explaining that the burdensome language of the bylaw in ATP 
Tour could lead shareholders to avoid bringing suit in Delaware due to the risk of liability for attor-
ney’s fees if their suit is unsuccessful). 
 215 See Cohen, supra note 197, at 24 (arguing that the legislature should not allow fee-shifting if a 
plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss or achieves “a significant financial or corporate governance 
remedy”); Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 560 (stating that Delaware acknowledges the possible benefits 
of non-pecuniary relief); Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 197, at 15 (dismissing the argument that plain-
tiffs’ lawyers would not bring a lawsuit if the corporation had a fee-shifting provision). 
 216 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 560. 
 217 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 127 n.4; Coffee, supra note 213 (explaining that 
plaintiffs rarely win on every claim, thus it is highly unlikely for them to achieve the full remedy they 
seek). 
 218 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 127 n.4; Coffee, supra note 213. 
 219 See Deutscher Tennis Bund, 480 F. App’x at 127 n.4; Coffee, supra note 213. 
 220 See Eric G. Andersen, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of Contract, 53 MD. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (noting that restitution is a major principle of American jurisprudence); George 
P. Roach, Counter-Restitution for Monetary Remedies in Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1272 
(2011) (arguing that receiving damages in current and future corporate litigation through the principle 
of restitution will offer significant benefits); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Federal Crimi-
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B. Interpreting Delaware’s Fee-Shifting Ban So That It Does Not Apply to 
Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
Recognizing that the Delaware State Legislature is unlikely to immediately 
reverse course and amend its statute to allow fee-shifting, Delaware courts 
should read the statute narrowly so that it does not apply to securities class ac-
tion lawsuits.221 Because of statutory ambiguity as to whether the fee-shifting 
prohibition will apply to securities class actions, many anticipate that the Dela-
ware courts will soon have to rule on this matter.222 It is possible that a plaintiff 
will bring a declaratory action in the Delaware Chancery Court seeking permis-
sion to file suit now that a defendant corporation’s fee-shifting bylaw has been 
invalidated by the state’s new statute.223 Because of the significance of this issue, 
no matter the ruling in the Chancery Court, such a case would most likely make 
its way to the Delaware Supreme Court in order to provide a definitive and final 
answer.224 
The Delaware courts should read the statute narrowly so that it does not ap-
ply to securities class action lawsuits because of the important policy considera-
tions of deterring these lawsuits.225 As previously discussed, securities class ac-
                                                                                                                           
nal Justice System, 77 JUDICATURE 90, 90 (1993) (explaining that Congress realized that restitution is 
vital to the criminal justice system). 
 221 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); Coffee, supra note 176 (observing that Dela-
ware courts may read the new statutes to allow fee-shifting in securities class actions); Cohen, supra 
note 176, at 10 (explaining that it is possible for Delaware courts to rule that the legislation does not 
apply to securities class actions). 
 222 See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Happens Next?, BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP., June 
2015, at 11, 11–12 (explaining that the statute’s ambiguity will likely lead Delaware courts to rule on 
whether the statute applies to securities class actions); Cohen, supra note 176, at 7 (stating that it is 
likely that plaintiffs will seek to use the new legislation to overturn the fee-shifting bylaws that have 
already been adopted by stock corporations). 
 223 See Cohen, supra note 176, at 9 (noting that it is expected that plaintiffs’ lawyers will file a 
declaratory judgment action in the Delaware Chancery Court to challenge the fee-shifting provision). 
There is a possibility that the fee-shifting bylaws could be challenged in a securities case in federal 
district court. See id.; see also Coffee, supra note 176. If challenged in federal court, the “court might 
stay the action and certify the issue of the proper construction of the Delaware statute to the Delaware 
Supreme Court.” Coffee, supra note 176. Alternatively, the federal court may keep the case and rule 
on potential federal preemption issues. See id. Because a securities case in federal court could expose 
plaintiffs to fee-shifting liability if they are unsuccessful, they will likely bring the challenge in the 
Chancery Court. See id.; Cohen, supra note 176, at 9. 
 224 See Coffee, supra note 176 (explaining that if a plaintiff brings a declaratory action in the 
Chancery Court, this process will likely “take longer []because the issue cannot be resolved authorita-
tively until the Delaware Supreme Court speaks”). 
 225 See Mike Chesney & Kye Parsons, Updated: Delaware’s Reputation as Corporate Haven 
Called into Question, WBOC (Aug. 7, 2015, 8:38 AM), http://www.wboc.com/story/29715615/
delawares-reputation-as-corporate-haven-called-into-question [http://perma.cc/68TQ-HLDR] (stating 
that “Delaware actively promotes itself as a business-friendly . . . state”); Benjamin Horney, Fee-
Shifting Bill Once Again Causes Divide in Delaware, LAW360 (May 8, 2015), http://www.law360.
com/articles/631329/fee-shifting-bill-once-again-causes-divide-in-delaware [http://perma.cc/M2D6-
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tion lawsuits have had a negative financial impact on both corporations and their 
shareholders.226 With a large majority of these lawsuits resulting in “disclosure-
only” settlements, the only true winners of these lawsuits are the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys.227 To stop this harmful, growing trend, the Delaware courts, if given the 
opportunity, should clarify that the statute applies only to “internal corporate 
claims” and not to securities class actions.228 This ruling would ensure that Del-
aware’s corporate policy goal of maintaining a proper balance between corpora-
tion and shareholder rights can continue.229 
Corporations will be able to deter frivolous class actions through fee-
shifting bylaws that are designed to ensure that plaintiffs will only bring actions 
that possess actual merit and are likely to result in a recovery.230 Shareholders 
will still be able to bring meritorious securities class actions, in addition to inter-
nal corporate claims, without fear of fee-shifting liability.231 There is a possibil-
ity that plaintiffs’ attorneys would just revise their claims to fall within the defi-
nition of “internal corporate claim” by claiming a “violation of a duty” by a di-
rector or officer.232 In these instances, however, the Delaware judiciary must be 
vigilant to dismiss such meritless claims and not allow the law to be so easily 
circumvented.233 
                                                                                                                           
3UYF] (explaining that a “hallmark” of Delaware’s corporate law tradition has been its “commitment 
to maintaining [a] balanced legal system”). 
 226 See BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (finding that shareholders lose $34 billion annually upon 
the announcement of class action lawsuits); Yap et al., supra note 49 (explaining that the filing of 
merger class action lawsuits is so probable that these associated legal fees have become a “transaction 
tax” that accompanies almost every merger or acquisition). 
 227 See KOUMRIAN, supra note 2, at 4 (finding that in 88% of merger cases filed in 2013, the 
settlement only resulted in disclosures); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (finding that the aver-
age attorney’s fees award for disclosure-only settlements is $749,000). 
 228 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); see also Coffee, supra note 176 (explaining that 
Delaware courts may read the new statutes to allow fee-shifting in securities class actions); Cohen, 
supra note 176, at 10 (describing how it is possible for Delaware courts to rule that the legislation 
does not apply to securities class actions). 
 229 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that corporations choose to incorporate in 
Delaware because of its balanced corporate environment); Horney, supra note 225 (observing that the 
fee-shifting prohibition raises doubt about Delaware’s promise to preserve a “balanced legal system”). 
 230 See Michael Greene, Fee-Shifting Bylaws Prompt Myriad Reactions as Delaware Bill Looms, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.bna.com/feeshifting-bylaws-prompt-n17179925005/ 
[http://perma.cc/6MD7-TM94] (referencing a law professor who has explained that fee-shifting by-
laws are meant to deter meritless lawsuits rather than prevent meritorious ones); Letter from Lisa A. 
Rickard, supra note 195 (explaining that the use of fee-shifting bylaws provides corporations with a 
device to defend shareholders against the costs of frivolous litigation). 
 231 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b); Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 197, at 15 (dismiss-
ing the argument that plaintiffs’ lawyers would not bring a lawsuit if the corporation had a fee-shifting 
provision). 
 232 See Coffee, supra note 180 (explaining that plaintiffs’ attorneys may attempt to come within 
the new legislation by revising their claims to assert a “violation of a duty” by officers or directors, 
“even though this does not legally strengthen their case”). 
 233 See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 602. 
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Additionally, the Delaware courts should interpret the statute narrowly, so 
as not to harm Delaware’s status as America’s corporate haven.234 Recently 
many corporations that were initially attracted to the state’s business-friendly 
reputation have expressed great displeasure with what they view as the state’s 
growing hostility towards business.235 One of the primary reasons cited for this 
negative development is Delaware’s unwillingness to enact effective measures to 
combat the increasing trend of shareholder litigation.236 At the same time, other 
states have made strong efforts to enact more business-friendly laws and de-
velop specialized business courts to directly compete with Delaware.237 Some 
corporations have even threatened to reincorporate in a different state due to 
Delaware’s unwillingness to combat shareholder litigation.238 Now that the Del-
aware State Legislature has passed its fee-shifting prohibition, some believe that 
it is only a matter of time before some corporations leave the state, which could 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (54% of public companies and 85% of U.S. companies 
that have gone public in the past two years have incorporated in Delaware); Hoffman, Shareholder Suits, 
supra note 137 (noting that two-thirds of Fortune 500 companies are Delaware corporations); U.S. 
Chamber Comments on Delaware State Senate Vote on “Fee Shifting” Bill, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM (May 12, 2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-chamber-
comments-on-delaware-state-senate-vote-on-fee-shifting-bill/ [http://perma.cc/6WXS-TSQV] (quoting 
the president of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform as stating that the passage of the fee-
shifting legislation “threatens Delaware’s billion-dollar incorporation franchise”). 
 235 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that there are several companies, including 
Dole Food Co., that believe Delaware has become less welcoming to businesses); Jonathan Starkey, 
Discord Tests Delaware’s Corporate-Friendly Image, DEL. ONLINE (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.
delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2015/08/28/discord-tests-delawares-corporate-friendly-image/
71319508/ [http://perma.cc/UD2D-A8RM] (describing how Delaware’s corporate status has been 
subject to an “unusual level of public and political conflict” over the past year due in part to the state’s 
inability to curtail shareholder suits). 
 236 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that Delaware’s inability to curb shareholder 
litigation has led companies to believe the state has become “less hospitable” towards business); 
Rickard, supra note 137 (explaining that Delaware’s “reputation as a fair and hospitable business 
locale is at risk” because of the legislature’s attempt to prohibit fee-shifting bylaws). 
 237 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that other states are “angling for Delaware’s 
business”); Benjamin Horney, Del. Fee-Shifting Bill Won’t Cause Corporate Exodus, LAW360 (June 
5, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/660388/del-fee-shifting-bill-won-t-cause-corporate-exodus 
[http://perma.cc/D9JM-SSTD] (naming Oklahoma and Connecticut as states that are trying to reinvent 
themselves as “safe havens” if corporations decide to leave Delaware). In May 2014, Oklahoma en-
acted a fee-shifting amendment covering all derivative lawsuits. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 
(2012); Horney, supra. Proposed legislation in Connecticut seeks to create a commission to develop a 
ten-year plan to “challenge and eventually overtake Delaware as the leading state in the country for 
businesses and corporations to locate, incorporate and do business.” See Horney, supra. Similar to 
Delaware, Michigan and Texas have moved to establish separate business courts with judges steeped 
in corporate-law expertise. Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137. 
 238 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that Dole Food Co. and First Citizens 
BancShares Inc. have threatened to move out of Delaware and reincorporate elsewhere due to the 
threat of frivolous shareholder lawsuits); Starkey, supra note 235 (describing how “name-brand cor-
porations,” including Ancestry.com, have been threatening to leave Delaware if the state does not act 
to limit shareholder lawsuits). 
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mark the beginning of a mass exodus of corporations out of Delaware.239 With 
Delaware’s economic well-being so heavily dependent on being America’s cor-
porate haven, the Delaware courts have a strong interest in authorizing fee-
shifting in securities class actions to protect this status.240 Doing so will help re-
store corporations’ confidence in Delaware’s business-friendly reputation and 
remove the growing doubt surrounding its future as the nation’s corporate ha-
ven.241 
Although the Delaware State Legislature is unlikely to immediately reverse 
course, it would be best if the legislature, not the courts, clarified that the fee-
shifting prohibition does not apply to securities class action lawsuits.242 The legis-
lature could accomplish this by amending the statute to specifically exclude secu-
rities class action lawsuits.243 First, this would provide more certainty for corpora-
tions, because even if the Delaware courts rule that the statute allows fee-shifting 
in securities class actions, there is always the possibility that courts will reverse or 
refuse to follow the precedent, without warning, in the future.244 By having the 
legislature amend the statue, even if they were to reverse course in the future, the 
legislative process would provide warning and allow the corporations to have a 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Coffee, supra note 213 (describing how the fee-shifting prohibition could lead to “inter-
jurisdictional competition” as other states might authorize fee-shifting to attract companies to reincor-
porate in their state); Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137 (explaining that some general counsels are talk-
ing about reincorporating in more “management-friendly states” because of the fee-shifting prohibi-
tion); Horney, supra note 225 (noting that, before passage of the fee-shifting prohibition, many feared 
that Delaware corporations would seek to reincorporate in other states if the bill was adopted). 
 240 See Stephen Bainbridge, Delaware’s Decision: Viewing Fee Shifting Bylaws Through a Public 
Choice Lens, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/delawares-decision-viewing-fee-shifting-bylaws-through-a-public-
choice-lens.html [http://perma.cc/MGW3-URT7] (explaining that because Delaware benefits so great-
ly from its corporate dominance, its government has a strong interest in preserving it); Chesney & 
Parsons, supra note 225 (stating that harm to Delaware’s status as a corporate haven would be a real 
problem because it is vitally important to the state’s economy, resulting in the employment of thou-
sands of people and allowing Delaware to have no sales tax and low property taxes); Hoffman, Dole, 
supra note 137 (explaining that Delaware is projected to collect more than $1 billion in corporate fees 
this year, which comprises 26% of its annual budget). 
 241 See Hoffman, Dole, supra note 137; Rickard, supra note 137; Starkey, supra note 235 (report-
ing that Ancestry.com’s chief legal officer questioned whether Delaware’s corporate foundation re-
mains strong); see also Judy Greenwald, New Law Frustrates Efforts to Cut Shareholder Lawsuits, 
BUS. INS. (July 19, 2015), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20150719/NEWS06/307199970/
new-delaware-law-frustrates-efforts-to-cut-shareholder-lawsuits?tags=%7C75%7C80%7C83%7C302 
(explaining that the fee-shifting prohibition will encourage new companies to incorporate in other 
states besides Delaware). 
 242 Cohen, supra note 197, at 23 (arguing that the Delaware State Legislature, not the judiciary, is 
best suited to resolve the fee-shifting issue). 
 243 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b). 
 244 See, e.g., Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Del. 1993) (overruling prior precedent 
regarding the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (refusing to follow the precedent established in Graham 
v. Allis–Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), in deciding if the board of directors had a duty 
to monitor). 
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democratic say in the process.245 Second, a legislative amendment would help to 
reassure many corporations of Delaware’s status as a state that is welcoming to 
business and management.246 Lastly, having the legislature resolve this issue 
would be more efficient, as protracted litigation would impose high costs on par-
ties without necessarily providing a definite resolution of the issue.247 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholder lawsuits have reached epidemic proportions. Lawsuits are 
filed after almost every merger and/or acquisition and result in legal fees that 
cost corporations billions of dollars. It is clear that there is a need for drastic 
and swift shareholder lawsuit reform. The Delaware legislature should explicit-
ly allow stock corporations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws, subject to two limita-
tions.  First, before a corporation adopts a fee-shifting bylaw, it should be ap-
proved by a majority of the corporation’s shareholders. Second, the legislature 
should create a maximum standard that corporations can impose on claimants in 
order for claimants to avoid liability for the defendant corporation’s fees. Rec-
ognizing that the Delaware legislature is unlikely to immediately reverse course 
on this issue, alternatively, the Delaware courts should read the statute narrowly 
so as not to apply to securities class action lawsuits. This narrow reading will 
deter the harmful effects of frivolous shareholder class action lawsuits and will 
reaffirm Delaware’s status as America’s corporate haven. By taking either of 
these actions the state can strike a compromise between corporate and share-
holder rights that will work to deter frivolous shareholder lawsuits, and in turn 
ensure that Delaware remains at the forefront of corporate law. 
GREGORY DICIANCIA 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See LaCroix, supra note 159 (providing an example of the drawn-out timeframe of Delaware’s 
legislative response to the ATP Tour decision and the fact that interested parties were able to express 
their opinions on the proposed legislation). 
 246 See Bainbridge, supra note 240 (explaining that because Delaware benefits so greatly from its 
corporate dominance, its government has a strong interest in preserving it); Hoffman, Dole, supra note 
137 (explaining that Delaware’s inability to curb the growing trend of shareholder litigation is one of 
the reasons companies believe the state has become less hospitable towards business); Rickard, supra 
note 137 (explaining that Delaware’s “reputation as a fair and hospitable business locale is at risk” 
because of the Delaware State Legislature’s attempt to prohibit fee-shifting bylaws). 
 247 See Coffee, supra note 176; Cohen, supra note 176, at 9. 
  
 
 
